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CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS FOR NEW JERSEY:
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION, THE MODEL
PENAL CODE, AND JUST DESERTS*
Robert S. Raymar**
Many states and the Congress are at crossroads in their efforts to
deal with criminal offenders. Although New Jersey has experienced
many of the problems that have surfaced in criminal justice systems
throughout the nation, New Jersey is contemplating and implementing solutions which differ from those being recommended elsewhere
by continuing to focus on rehabilitation of the criminal offender. Most
recently, the state legislature, with the passage of its version of the
Model Penal Code in the General Assembly,' appears ready to require sentencing judges to fit sentences even more than ever to the
characteristics of the offender. 2 The state supreme court in State v.
* The author wishes to thank the Research Program in Criminal Justice of the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, and
members of the School's 1976 and 1977 Criminal Justice Policy Task Forces, for helpful
thoughts incorporated in this article. The article has profited substantially from many
suggestions made by Ronnie F. Liebowitz, Esq.
** B.A. Princeton University; J.D. Yale University; Member, New Jersey Bar. The
author is a former Deputy Attorney General in the New Jersey Division of Criminal
Justice, and has been a Visiting Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at the
Woodrow Wilson School.
I N.J. Assembly Bill No. 642 (introduced Feb. 19, 1976), as amended, (June 14,
1976), was passed by the General Assembly on November 22, 1976. 64 N.J. LEGIS.
INDEX A17 (Feb. 17, 1977). This bill, which proposes a "New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice" (Model Penal Code), will be cited throughout this article as M.P.C. § 2C:X-X.
2 See M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(b) which lists eleven factors to "be accorded weight in favor
of withholding sentence of imprisonment." Those factors which focus on the offender
include questions of whether (1) previous "criminal activity" is completely absent or
has been lacking "for a substantial period of time," id. § 2C:44-1(b)(7); (2) the action
was the result of exceptional circumstances, id. § 2C:44-1(b)(8); (3) the temperament of
the offender suggests that he is not likely to commit another crime, id. § 2C:44-1(b)(9);
(4) he will react well to probation, id. § 2C:44-1(b)(10); and (5) incarceration would
work an extreme "hardship [on] himself or his dependents," id. § 2C:44-1(b)(11).
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Leonardis3 has expanded the availability of participation in pretrial
5
intervention programs (PTI), 4 whose main goal is rehabilitation.
Furthermore, legislation making release on parole virtually automatic,
instead of dependent upon an inmate's rehabilitation, 6 is at an impasse. 7
This article seeks to evaluate whether the effort to rehabilitate
should continue to have great weight in determining the disposition
of criminal offenders in New Jersey, or whether a punishmentoriented "just deserts" system of dispositions should be substituted.8
3 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), aff'd on other grounds on rehearing, No.
A-20/21/52 (N.J. May 31, 1977).
4 See notes 28-38 infra and accompanying text.
5 71 N.J. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328. In discussing the purposes underlying PTI programs, the court stated that "[w]hile the goal of expeditious disposition is certainly important and central to the PTI concept, it is at the same time subordinate to the rehabilitative function of PTI." Id. In support of this conclusion, the court discussed
People v. Reed, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1974), which, in the words of the Leonardis court, "explicitly recognized the primacy of the rehabilitative function." 71 N.J.
at 98-99 n.8, 363 A.2d at 328.
6 Compare N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1452 (introduced Feb. 3, 1976) with N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:4-123.6, .14 (West 1964). The current New Jersey statute looks to a potential
parolee's ability to "assume his proper and rightful place in society." Id. § 30:4-123.14.
The parole board has the authority to determine the standards which must be met for
parole eligibility, and the enabling statute suggests such criteria as abandonment of
"evil" habits and friends and repaying the victims of the crime. Id. § 30:4-123.6. These
particular standards reflect concern with the offender's rehabilitation. In general, however, the overriding goals of the parole board are unclear. See notes 283-88 infra and
accompanying text.
In contrast, the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 1452 is "to introduce more objectivity
and predictability into the parole process, and to eliminate man,' of the problem areas
in existing law which have lend [sic] to inequities and to dissatisfaction with the administration of parole." N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1452, Statement, at 11 (introduced Feb.
3, 1976). The most important difference is the requirement that the parole board release
an inmate "unless" it finds "that [he] has engaged in conduct indictable in nature"
during his imprisonment or believes "that there is substantial likelihood that [he] will
commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time.'" Id.
§ 6(c) (emphasis added). The release would be granted upon completion of a "mandatory minimum term, or 25 years of any' life sentence, or one-third of the maximum sentence where no mandatory minimum term or life sentence has been imposed." Id.
§ 6(a).
7 Although the bill was introduced on February 3, 1976, it has never progressed
beyond a second reading in the Assembly. 64 N.J. LEGIS. INDEX A37 (Mar. 21, 1977).
8 The concept of just deserts if founded on the notion that a member of society
should be punished in proportion to the seriousness of the act designated by society as
wrongful. See generally notes 172-228 infra and accompanying text.
This article will not consider whether existing criminal statutes are just. For some
conflicting views on this point, see CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 16-25 (R. Quinney
ed. 1974) ("law in capitalist society gives political recognition to powerful social and
economic interests"); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 356-62 (1971) (legislative decisions must not be viewed as a contest between competing interests but as an attempt to
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After examining the empirical and philosophical soundness of the dispositional goals underlying Leonardis and the Model Penal Code, the
author will explore the traditional justifications for criminal
sentencing, 9 and will indicate how the Leonardis and Model Penal
Code systems reflect these rationales. The basic premise of the article
is that the directions of criminal justice reform being taken by New
Jersey are at odds with those being taken by other jurisdictions, 10
and that New Jersey is ignoring the conclusions reached by commentators who have reexamined the traditional goals of criminal dispositions. Those conclusions are that dispositions should fit the offense
more than the offender,' 1

and that judicial discretion in imposing

criminal dispositions should be restricted. 12
implement the policy that best serves the principles of justice); TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,

FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

3-9

(1976) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND] ("greatest indictment of the

criminal justice system in the United States is . . . that it fails in providing equitable
DOING JUSTICE 143-49 (1976) (in an unjust society both
"traditional utilitarian theories" and just deserts are unfair).
9 For an excellent analysis of sentence justifications and the historical progression of
sentencing goals in this country, see Dershowitz, Background Paper to TWVENTIETH
justice"); A. VON HIRSCH,

CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 67.
10 States such as California, Maine, and Washington currently have fixed-sentencing

laws. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4752 (West); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1252 (West Supp. 1976); Act of Feb. 20, 1976, ch. 38, § 2,
1975-76 Wash. Laws 151 (to be codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.020). For additional discussion of the trend toward "flat-time sentencing," see N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1976, at 17, col. 1.
On the federal level, a bill introduced in Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy
and several consponsors is an attempt to amend title 18 to impose tighter sentencing
guidelines for judges to follow, S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3579, 3621, 3657, 123
CONG. REC. S373 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977), and to provide appellate review of sentencing, id. § 3742. The bill would establish a "United States Commission on Sentencing,"
id. § 3802, to "promulgate and distribute to all Federal courts suggested sentencing
ranges for specific offenses," as well as "guidelines [to] be considered by the sentencing court in determining the appropriate sentence for a defendant and general policy
statements [on] sentencing," id. § 3803.

Another federal bill, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S6835 (daily
ed. May 2, 1977), is a proposed general revision of title 18. Senator McClellan, its sponsor, and Senator Kennedy, his cosponsor, favor a specific delineation of the underlying
policies of the criminal code and of sentencing in particular. See id. §§ 101(b), 2003(a)(2).
In addition, the sentencing judge is required to consider specific guidelines, promulgated by a statutory sentencing commission, for sentences, and to state why he has
chosen the sentence imposed. Id. § 2003(a)(3), (b).
ii See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 66-76; Dershowitz, Let the Punishment
Fit the Crime, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 7, 27.
12 M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 69-85 (1972); A. VON HIRSCH, sudprO note 8,

at 98-104; Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 27.
Judge Frankel suggests a variety of methods by which to limit the discretion of the
sentencing judge, including (1) the use of sentencing councils composed by judges, M.
FRANKEL, supra at 69-74, (2) mixed sentencing tribunals composed of judges, psychia-
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Accordingly, the final sections will propose an alternative system
of dispositions for New Jersey, premised on the view that the main
goal of a criminal justice system should be the protection of society
through just techniques.' 3 In formulating this proposal certain additional concepts should be borne in mind. First, a distinction must be
drawn between justifications for a system of criminal dispositions in
general and justifications for dispositions meted out to specific
offenders. 14 Utilitarian concerns such as deterrence of future offenses
trists or psychologists, and sociologists or educators, id. at 74-75, and (3) appellate review of sentencing, id. at 75-85. Although he currently appears to favor the use of appellate review, id. at 85, Judge Frankel also recognizes a need for comprehensive
"study and action by the Congress and the state legislatures to govern the field of sentencing," id. at 84-85.
Professor von Hirsch proposes that discretion be limited by the promulgation of
"'presumptive sentence[s]' " from which the sentencing judge could vary slightly, but
only "if he finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances" arising from the characteristics of the offense. A. VON HIRSCH, supra at 99-101. Although von Hirsch does not
decide what branch of government should set these "presumptive sentences," he appears to favor the judiciary, either through the formulation of standards by the trial court
or through appellate review. Id. at 102-04.
Professor Dershowitz also favors the "presumptive sentence" approach, but he
proposes that aggravating and mitigating factors be derived from the offender's background as well as from the characteristics of the offense, and also suggests that the
"'presumptive sentence" be set by the legislature. Dershowitz, supra at 27; see notes
226-28 infra and accompanying text; cf. Hoffman & DeGostin, An Argument for SelfImposed Explicit Judicial Sentencing Standards, 3 J. CRmI. JUST. 195 (1975) (criticizing
disparity in sentencing, but focusing upon channeling rather than eliminating discretion, and suggesting formulation of guidelines for judicial exercise of discretion by a
group of "judicial peers" rather than by individual judges).
13See N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 12 (1971) (relying upon Bergan,

The Sentencing Power in Criminal Cases, 13 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1949)). Although the principal goal of the criminal justice system is to protect and maintain society, N. KITTRIE,
supra at 12, the desire to achieve social order is not the sole consideration in fashioning
such a system. Therefore a balance must be struck from which the law can "preserve
not only the society but its ideals and values as well. And, in so doing, it must balance
its desire for stability and order against its other values." A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8,
at xxviii. See also Singer, Sending Men to Prison: ConstitutionalAspects of the Burden
of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing
Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 84 (1972).
14Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3, 3 (1955). The distinction has been defined as a difference "between justifying a practice as a system of rules
to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these
rules." Id. at 5. The "practice" or "system" is developed to "furthe[r] the interests of
society," id. at 5-6, and thus, utilitarian rationales, such as deterrence and incapacitation, are appropriate to justify the "practice" or "system" in general, id. at 5. Rawls also
makes a distinction between the retributive justification behind a judge's sentencing
function and the utilitarian justification behind the legislature's function. Id. at 6; accord, Harris, Disquisition on the Need for a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning
Systems, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 263, 286-87 (1975). Harris concludes that "[in designing a
system of laws and sanctions for their violation, we should look forward to the future
effects upon society. In imposing a particular sanction, however, we should look only
backward, to the act committed." Id. at 287 (emphasis in original).
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and incapacitation of dangerous offenders may be appropriate in defining offenses and in devising an overall system of sanctions, but
they interfere with the determination of what disposition is just for a
specific offender. 15 Similarly, while rehabilitation is a salutary goal in
that it may enable society to help offenders conform to its rules in the
future, its consideration in the disposition of an individual offender
through PTI, sentencing, or parole is unjust and ineffective because
of the difficulty in knowing whether that offender can be or has been
rehabilitated. ' 6 Second, it it important to recognize that offenders are
no longer regarded as potential " 'slave[s] of the State,' -17 but are
now held by courts to be subject only to the fewest deprivations
necessary to further the legitimate interests of society.' It will be
suggested that a just deserts system best satisfies these principles.
15See Harris, supra note 14, at 286.
16 See id. at 287; notes 117-26, 130-35 infra and accompanying text. It will be suggested that rehabilitative opportunities be made increasingly available to offenders, on a
voluntary basis, but that rehabilitation not be considered in meting out individual sentencing or parole dispositions. See note 206 infra and accompanying text.
17 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting from Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871)). Ruffin is representative of early
cases expressing the theory that offenders are "slaves of the State undergoing punishment for heinous crimes." 62 Va. (21 Gratt) at 796. A later Georgia case, Westbrook v.
State, 133 Ga. 578, 585, 66 S.E. 788, 792 (1909), exemplified the more modern view,
however, when it stated that "[t]he convict occupies a different attitude from the slave
toward society. He . . . has all the rights of an ordinary citizen which are not expressly
or by necessary implication taken from him by law."
18 E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) ("though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime"); Moore
v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) ("constitutional rights need be denied
prisoners only to the extent 'justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system' " (quoting from Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948))).
The following cases have expressly recognized rights which are retained by prisoners: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 553, 555-72 (prisoners entitled to some due process protections in a disciplinary proceeding involving revocation of good-time credits);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-21 (1974) (personal correspondence of prisoners may be censored, but censorship subject to certain conditions and procedural protections to avoid impinging on first amendment rights; absolute han on access to paralegals
invalid); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (right to legal services in postconviction habeas corpus proceeding includes the right to use "jailhouse lawyers" if the
state does not provide "some reasonable alternative" for legal assistance); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966) (equal protection requires that a prisoner being committed to a mental institution at the end of his sentence be afforded the same "jury
review" or "judicial determination" available to others so committed); Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (a prisoner's right to federal habeas corpus relief cannot be
"abridge[d] or impair[ed]" by the state); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547 (1st
Cir. 1971) (prisoners have the right under the first amendment to correspond with the
news media regarding prison matters); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202-03 (2d
Cir. 1971) (en banc) (prisoner cannot be punished for written expressions of his beliefs
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Although it is the function of the legislature to establish policies
for the disposition of offenders, 19 legislatures-including New
Jersey's-have generally "abdicated" this responsibility. 20 As a result,
individual judges have been invited to devise their own criteria for
dealing with offenders, achieving the goal of protecting society by
fashioning sentences to suit individual cases. 2 1 In molding their senalthough the writings may be confiscated to maintain security), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of a
strap for punishment held a violation of eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1968) (prison
officials must establish "a clear and present danger" in order to prevent Black Muslims
from receiving religious literature); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110-12 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (prisoners have a right of access to legal materials, which right cannot be
unduly restricted by the state), aff'd sub nor. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
See generally N.

MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 21 (1974); see also Note,

Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87 (1971).
For a discussion of the standards on prisoners' rights recently proposed by a federal
advisory commission, see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS &
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 17-72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].

19Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (determinations regarding the
"severity," "efficacy" and "apportionment" of punishments "are peculiarly questions of
legislative policy"); I. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 107 ("judgments affecting consequences so grave as the length and character of sentences" and "the legitimate bases
for" them "should ... be matters of law"); cf. Baker & Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 619 (1977) ("first step in determining an appropriate
criminal sentence is to identify the purposes to be served").
20 M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 104-06; accord, State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 200,
162 A.2d 851, 852-53 (1960); Harris, supra note 14, at 264-65. In Ivan, the New Jersey
supreme court found that "[ojur Legislature has not stated the aims to he achieved by
punishment." 33 N.J. at 200, 162 A.2d at 853. Harris states that, in general, legislatures
have failed to fulfill their responsibility in three ways: (1) by "provid[ing] little guidance in terms of what the sentencing courts are expected to accomplish through" an
individual criminal disposition; (2) by enacting "[p]enal codes [which] are silent or
vague as to the criteria to be used in determing [sic] specific sentences"; and (3) by
"authorizing various sentencing alternatives," resulting in chaos. Harris, supra at
264-65. For a discussion of how the Model Penal Code also fails to provide priorities or
guidelines, see note 59 infra and accompanying text.
21 See M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 5-11; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 28-29;

Harris, supra note 14, at 264-72. A total lack of consistency in the dispositions of individual offenders results from several factors. M. FRANKEL, supra at 7. One cause is the
lack of sentencing guidelines. Id. 5-6. In addition, the judicial approach to sentencing
often endorses tailoring the punishment to the offender's characteristics and situation as
well as to his crime. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949); Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 200, 162 A.2d 851, 852
(1960); State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 184, 142 A.2d 65, 79 (1958). And further contributing
to this disparity' is the fact that "[t]he judge's sentencing decision is not bound by any of
the constraints which ordinarily govern his judicial work," since he need not justify the
imposition of a given sentence, and thus generally does not do so. A. VON HIRSCH,
supra at 28.
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tences, judges in New Jersey reach a "composite judgment," 2 2 utilizing and reconciling the conflicting and often overlapping 23 justifications of rehabilitation of the offender, deterrence of future crime by
that offender and others, incapacitation of offenders dangerous to the
community, and denunciation or punishment of persons who have
violated society's rules. 24 Two recent developments evidence New
Jersey's continuing emphasis on individualized dispositions.
PRETRIAL INTERVENTIONISTATE v. LEONARDIS

Pretrial intervention programs were introduced in New Jersey in
1970 through the adoption of New Jersey Rule 3:28 by the New Jersey supreme court. 2 5 PTI programs allow the pretrial referral of defendants to community-based rehabilitative programs providing counseling, training, and job placement. A defendant may remain in a PTI
program for a period not to exceed six months,2 6 and if he successfully completes the program, criminal charges against him are
dismissed.2 7 In 1976, the New Jersey supreme court in State v.
Leonardis strongly suggested that PTI programs be established in all
New Jersey counties, the court finding that such programs had
achieved success by lowering the rate of recidivism and by fostering
28
skills leading to employment.
22 State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 201, 162 A.2d 851, 853 (1960).
23 It will become evident to the reader that rehabilitation and incapacitation are
similar in that both seek to prevent future crimes by specific offenders, although by
different methods. Incapacitation and punishment often appear to justify identical dispositions, but for different reasons.
24 State v. Dunbar, 69 N.J. 333, 339, 354 A.2d 281, 284 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting) ("punishment [must] perform one or more of the [recognized] functions: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence and protection of society"); State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197,
199-201, 162 A.2d 851, 852-53 (1960) ("sentencing judge must deal with ...complex of
purposes, determining in each situation how the public interest will best be served").
For more detailed discussions of the four rationales for punishment, see notes
74-136 infra and accompanying text (rehabilitation); notes 137-56 infra and accompanying text (incapacitation); notes 157-71 infra and accompanying text (deterrence); notes
172-213 infra and accompanying text (punishment).
25 See N.J.R. 3:28 note.
26 Id, 3:28(b), (c)(2). The initial time period allocated for program participation is
three months. Id. 3:28(b). This period may be extended an additional three months
"[o]n recommendation of the program director and with the consent of the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant." Id. 3:28(c)(2), If the charge involves controlled dangerous
substances, additional postponements up to one year may be granted by the judge. Id.
3:28(d).
27 Id. 3:28(c)(1). Dismissal of the complaint requires "recommendation of the program director and .. .consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant." Id.
28 71 N.J. at 94, 363 A.2d at 326. The Leonardis court briefly described some of the
available county PTI programs. Id. at 106, 363 A.2d at 332. These include broad-based
programs which admit individuals "charged with almost any criminal offense," others
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The main issue decided by the Leonardis court was that PTI
programs could not presumptively exclude individuals charged with
certain offenses. 2 9 The court reasoned that the rationale underlying
PTI is rehabilitative 30 and that consequently, "[g]reater emphasis
should be placed on the offender than on the offense." 3 1 Although no
one could automatically be excluded from PTI, the court said that
eligibility "criteria must be sufficiently discriminatory to assure selection of those applicants who have the best prospects for rehabilita32
tion."
dealing with defendants having drug-related problems, and some which treat "cases
[arising] from a pattern of alcoholism." Id. In describing these different programs the
court stated that "there is considerable room for variation in the development and implementation of county programs." Id.
29
Id. at 113, 121, 363 A.2d at 336, 340. The court opined that conditioning admission solely on the nature of the offense charged might be discriminatory, although it
"defer[red] such considerations until another day, and decline[d] to determine this
cause on constitutional grounds." Id. at 113, 363 A.2d at 336.
The offenses charged in Leonardis and in its companion case in the supreme court
were possession of marijuana and hashish, posession with intent to distribute hashish,
and conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana. Id. at 90, 92, 363 A.2d at 323, 324.
This article will not consider whether it is appropriate to classify such offenses with the
"[hleinous [o]ffenses" which are generally excluded from PTI programs: "Atrocious Assault and Battery where the victim is seriously injured; Homicide; Mayhem, Forceable
Rape; Assault and Battery on a Police Officer involving injury; Armed Robbery where
the victim is injured; Sale of a Controlled Dangerous Substance." 71 N.J. at 90-91 &
n.3, 363 A.2d at 324 (quoting from Bergen County Probation Dep't, Bergen County
Pre-Trial Intervention Project, Exclusion Criteria Al (available from Bergen County
Probation Dep't, Hackensack, N.J.)).
A second issue in Leonardis was what due process standards had to be met before
an offender could be denied admission to a PTI program. See 71 N.J. at 113-14, 363
A.2d at 336. The court decided this issue by limiting "the virtually untrammeled discretion" that prosecutors had exercised with regard to admissions. Id. at 121, 363 A.2d at
340. The court required prosecutors to set forth reasons for refusing to consent to an
offender's admission. Id. at 119, 122, 363 A.2d at 339, 340-41.
Further due process protections are afforded defendants by the review procedures
formally established in the court's PTI Guidelines. If an offender moves to challenge a
denial of admission, a designated judge is to decide the motion, after a hearing, upon a
standard of "arbitrary or capricious action." Order Implementing Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey, 99 N.J.L.J. 865, 875 Guideline 8 (Sept. 8,
1976).
30 71 N.J. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328. The Leonardis court recognized, however, that the
goals of pretrial diversion programs such as PTI are " 'two-fold.' " Id. at 96, 363 A.2d at
326-27 (quoting from Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667, 673 (1972)). The court identified these two goals
as "rehabilitation" and "expeditious disposition" of criminal charges, 71 N.J. at 96, 363
A.2d at 327, but held that "expeditious disposition is . .. subordinate to the rehabilitative function of PTI," id. at 98, 363 A.2d at 328.
For a discussion of the rationale behind PTI programs involving addicts, see Note,
supra at 669-73.
3171 N.J. at 102, 363 A.2d at 330; see id., at 112, 363 A.2d at 335.
32Id. at 100, 363 A.2d at 329.
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To implement its holding, the court outlined standards 33 which
were subsequently issued in the form of more detailed guidelines for
participation in PTI. 3 4 Under the guidelines, offenders "accused of
any crime [are] eligible for admission to [PTI] program[s]," with consideration to be given to "amenability to correction, responsiveness to
rehabilitation and nature of the offense." 3 5 Even second or subsequent offenders are eligible. 36 The guidelines make clear, however,
that the program is not intended for persons charged with minor offenses which are "likely" to "result in a suspended sentence without
probation or a fine." 3 7 In addition, applications from persons charged
with taking part in "organized criminal activity . . . or. . . [in] a

continuing criminal . . . enterprise," with deliberately threatening or
committing violence toward another person, or with "abreach of the
public trust . . . should generally be rejected," but each applicant
3
must be considered individually for rehabilitative potential.
In stressing the rehabilitative function in criminal dispositions,
New Jersey's PTI programs and the Leonardis court fail to give sufficient weight to other relevant sentencing considerations. For instance, as a result of Leonardis, some persons charged with serious
offenses are likely to be enrolled in PTI programs and their charges
dismissed after participation in a brief program, if they are certified
as having been rehabilitated. But unless rehabilitative efforts succeed,
and unless rehabilitation can be accurately predicted, the generous
use of PTI may disadvantage society significantly by returning to the

33Id.

at 121-22, 363 A.2d at 340-41.

34 Order Implementing Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial Intervention

in New
Jersey, 99 N.J.L.J. 865 (Sept. 8, 1976). The Guidelines will be cited throughout this
article as PTI Guidelines § X.
35 71 N.J. at 121-22, 363 A.2d at 340 (emphasis in original); see PTI Guidelines
§ 3(i) Comment.
36 PTI Guidelines § 3(e). This Guideline states that "[t]he pretrial intervention
program is not limited to 'first offenders.' Defendants, however, whose criminal history
includes a conviction or convictions of a serious nature should ordinarily be excluded,"
id., if this "prior criminal record may be indicative of a behavioral pattern not conducive to short term rehabilitation," id. Comment.
37 Id. § 3(d).
38 Id. § 3(i). The "breach of the public trust" exception is applied in cases "where
admission to a PTI program would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's crime." Id.
For all crimes in these categories, "[h]owever, . . . the applicant shall have the opportunity to present . . . any facts or materials demonstrating his amenability to the rehabilitative process, showing compelling reasons justifying his admission." Id. In this
fashion, the supreme court has recognized the conflict between society's need to limit
participation in the program to defendants for whom it may be effective, and the fact
that most defendants desire to avoid the stigma of a conviction and the resulting disabilities.
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community offenders who might have been incarcerated if the justification for the disposition were one other than rehabilitation.
Another problem with PTI is that it ignores the value to the
criminal justice system of having an initial conviction on an offender.
For example, if a conviction is a matter of record, a defendant's credibility can be impeached at a trial for a subsequent offense,3 9 thereby
increasing the likelihood of conviction. Furthermore, upon a second
conviction an offender shown to be a recidivist is more likely to be
incapacitated through incarceration than is one who appears to be a
first offender, 40 and is likely to be incarcerated for a longer period of
time. 4 1 By expanding the use of pretrial intervention, however, the
Leonardis court is in effect compelling sentencing courts to treat a
42
greater number of second offenders as first offenders.
39 N.J.R. EVID. 47.
40 THE

TASK

FORCE

ON

THE

ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE,

THE

PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 14 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK

FORCE REPORT] ("a majority of States require heavier punishment for repeated offenders"); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 84-88 ("[i]n the American criminal justice system . . . [t]he first offender can expect more lenient treatment than the repeater"); cf.
M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(b)(7) (one of the factors to "be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment" is that the offender "has no history of prior delinquency
or criminal activity").
Research of factors influencing probation and sentencing decisions indicates that a
prior conviction is one of the most important factors considered by probation officers
and sentencing judges. Carter, The Presentence Report and the Decision-Making
Process, in PROBATION AND PAROLE 128, 132-35 (R. Carter & L. Wilkins eds. 1970);
Carter & Wilkins, Some Factors in Sentencing Policy, in PROBATION AND PAROLE,

supra at 149. Probation officers ranked prior record as the most important factor influencing their recommendations concerning 500 federal offenders in the Northern District
of California from September 1964 to August 1965, while the district court judges surveyed ranked prior record as the third most important factor influencing their sentencing dispositions for the same 500 offenders. Id.
41 NEW JERSEY CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN POLICY COUNCIL, NEW JERSEY
CORRECTIONAL

FENDERS

MASTER PLAN DATA:

LENGTH OF STAY OF STATE INSTITUTION OF-

FISCAL 1970-1975, at 24-37 (Supp. II 1976) [hereinafter cited as MASTER

PLAN DATA].

42 This result occurs because if the offender successfully completes the PTI program, all charges against him are dismissed, N.J.R. 3:28(c)(1), and therefore there would
be no conviction on the individual's record.
It should be noted, however, that a sentencing judge would most likely know that a
second offender without prior convictions had previously been enrolled in a PTI program. PTI Guidelines § 3(g) states that "[d]efendants who had previously been enrolled
in a program of pretrial intervention . . . should not ordinarily be re-enrolled." (Citations
omitted.) Therefore, if the second offender chooses to apply again for PTI, the judge
would probably be informed, by either the program officials or the prosecutor, of the
offender's prior participation. It is also possible that the fact of prior participation in a
PTI program would be included in a presentence report. In these instances, the sentencing judge would know that the defendant had at least been charged with an offense,
even though his record showed no previous convictions. The evident failure of the pre-
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The Leonardis court suggested that the desire to avoid the
stigma of conviction is an incentive for an offender to enroll, participate and succeed in a PTI program. 4 3 Leonardis did not consider,
however, that one purpose of the criminal law, as opposed to the civil
law, is to place "the moral condemnation of the community" upon an
offender. 44 Permitting an offender to avoid even the stigma of a conviction erodes the deterrent value of the criminal law. More fundamentally, the criminal law also "defines the minimum conditions of
man s responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility." 45 By allowing an offender to escape criminal responsibility,
Leonardis undermines society's efforts to stimulate each of its
members-the law-breaker and the law-obeyer alike-to be responsi46
ble for the consequences of his conduct.
The court's emphasis upon the offender rather than upon the
offense is consistent with its reliance upon rehabilitation as the
preeminent objective of criminal dispositions. It will be shown, however, that at the present time society can have no confidence in its
ability to rehabilitate offenders or to predict which, if any, offenders
have been rehabilitated. 4 7 Furthermore, even if rehabilitation were
to occur and to be predicted accurately, pretrial intervention as an
alternative to formal criminal dispositions would still undermine the
purposes of the criminal law and decrease its deterrent value.
MODEL PENAL CODE

The sentencing provisions of the proposed New Jersey Model
Penal Code 48 may be viewed as an extension of the dispositional provious PTI participation to rehabilitate the individual might convince the judge that
"[t]here is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the
defendant will commit another crime." M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(1).
43 71 N.J. at 99-100, 363 A.2d at 328-29. In discussing "the stigma of conviction,"
id. at 99, 363 A.2d at 328, the court failed to note and evaluate recently enacted legislation removing many of the barriers to employment of ex-offenders in state government
and licensed professions, see id. at 99-100, 363 A.2d at 328-29. These new statutes
prohibit discrimination in state employment and in granting professional licenses on the
basis of a criminal conviction, unless the conviction relates directly to the occupation or
licensed profession involved or unless N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:93-5 (West 1969) (disqualifying "forever" from public employment various public officials convicted of crimes
involving bribery or solicitation of votes) is applicable. Id. §§ 11:10-6.1, :17-1 (West
1976) (state employment); id. § 2A:168A-1 to -6 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (licensing).
Under sections 11:10-6.1 and 2A:168A-2, permissible discriminations against criminals
must be justified in writing.
4Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405
(1958).
45 Id. at 410.
46 See id.
47 See notes 75-98, 117-27 infra and accompanying text.

48 M.P.C. §§ 2C:43-1-:46-3.
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cess begun with pretrial intervention. 49 Although the Code, at least
at first glance, recognizes several justifications other than rehabilitation which a judge should consider before meting out a disposition
via a sentence, 50 analysis reveals that the dispositional justification of
rehabilitation takes precedence over those of punishment, incapacitation and deterrence.
An examination of the Code's sentencing provisions discloses an
apparent attempt to fit sentences to the offenses committed, rather
than to the characteristics of the offender, thereby utilizing the justification of punishment. It requires that offenders receive a determinate
number of years of incarceration based upon the degree of severity of
the crime committed. 5 ' For example, the sentence for a first-degree
crime 5 2 would be fixed at a number of years between eight and
9 Compare PTI Guidelines § 1(a) (purposes of PTI include providing "early rehabilitative services") with M.P.C. § 2C:1-2(b)(2) (purposes of sentencing provisions
include rehabilitation of offenders); compare PTI Guidelines § 1(e) (purposes of PTI
include deterrence of "future criminal" activities) with M.P.C. § 2C:1-2(b)(3) (purposes
3
of sentencing provisions include deterrence); compare PTI Guidelines § (e) (defendants with prior "convictions of a serious nature" usually barred from participation in
PTI program) with M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(b)(7) (one factor to be considered "in favor of
withholding sentence of imprisonment" is a lack of prior criminal activity); compare
PTI Guidelines § 3(i)(1) (if offense is "part of organized criminal activity," the defendant ordinarily excluded from PTI program) with M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(4) (court shall not
order imprisonment unless it feels a prison sentence is necessary for the public safety
because, among other possibilities, "[t]he offense is characteristic of organized criminal
activity"); compare PTI Guidelines § 3(i)(4) (defendant ordinarily excluded from PTI
program if offense was "a breach of the public trust [and] admission to a PTI program
would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's crime") with M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(3)
(court shall not order imprisonment unless it feels a prison sentence is necessary for the
public safety because "[a] lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime [involving] a breach of the public trust").
It should be noted that a more informal type of disposition occurs at an even earlier
stage than PTI when police officers and prosecutors make a decision whether or not to
charge alleged offenders in the first instance. Such decisions are not examined in this
article. For a discussion of police dispositions, see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
5 See M.P.C. § 2C:1-2(b). The purposes mentioned for sentencing offenders are
prevention of crime, rehabilitation of offenders, protection of society through the deterrent effect of prison sentences, assurance of appropriate and non-arbitrary punishments,
differentiation among treatment of offenders, and "advance[ment] . . . of scientific
methods and knowledge in sentencing offenders," Id. These purposes are defined as
"general" and no ranking order is established. Id. See also O'Leary, Gottfredson &
Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 555, 561 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as O'Leary].
51M.P.C. § 2C:43-6. For purposes of sentencing, four degrees of crimes are defined. Id. § 2C:43-1. To determine the degree of any particular crime, it is necessary to
refer to the section of the Code specifically dealing with that crime. E.g., id.
§§ 2C: 11-3(b), -4(b), -5(b) (defining three degrees of criminal homicide).
52 Examples of crimes of the first degree are murder, id. § 2C:11-3(b), and aggravated rape, id. § 2C:14-1(a).
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twenty, 53 and for a second-degree crime, 54 between five and eight. 55
The Code also appears to advance the goals of incapacitating
dangerous offenders and deterring other potential offenders. There is
a presumption of imprisonment for certain first-degree and seconddegree crimes, 56 and extended prison terms may be imposed upon
persistent offenders, offenders who are part of an ongoing criminal
enterprise, and criminals for hire. 57 In addition, a court may require
that a defendant convicted of a first-degree or second-degree crime
serve a mandatory minimum term of up to one-half his sentence be58
fore being eligible for parole.
Unfortunately, however, priorities are not explicitly established
among the sentencing justifications underlying the Code nor are
guidelines set forth to assist judges in reconciling conflicting goals in
particular cases. 59 Consequently, it would be impossible to ensure
that similarly situated offenders were treated similarly. Without an
53 Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (as originally introduced, maximum sentence was 15 years).
An exception to the usual first-degree sentencing range is made, however, for firstdegree murder which may carry either a maximum sentence of 30 years or a sentence of
30 years with a minimum requirement of 15 years served before the offender is eligible
for parole. Id. § 2C: 11-3(b). In addition, all first-, second-, or third-degree offenders may
be subject to extended sentences if certain criteria are present. Id. §§ 2C:43-7, :44-3.
See note 57 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of extended terms.
4 Examples of second-degree crimes are manslaughter, M.P.C. § 2C:11-4(b), and
extortion, id. § 2C:20-2(b)(1).
55 Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(2). Third-degree crimes, such as one form of statutory rape, id.
§ 2C:14-3(b), and theft over $500, id. § 2C:20-2(b)(2), may receive a sentence between
three and five years, id. § 2C:43-6(a)(3). Perpetrators of fourth-degree crimes such as
interference with custody, id. § 2C:13-4(a)(2), and possession of a switchblade knife, id.
§ 2C:39-3(e), are subject to a sentence of up to 18 months, id. § 2C:43-6(a)(4).
56 Id. § 2C:44-1(d). The court is required to imprison an offender for a first- or
second-degree offense whenever the "statute defining [the] offense ... provides that a
presumption of imprisonment shall be applied . . . or where a statute . . . provides for a
mandatory sentence." Id. An exception to this presumption, however, provides that a
prison sentence will not be imposed if "having regard to the character and condition of
the defendant, [the court] is of the opinion that his imprisonment would be a serious
injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." Id.
57 Id. § 2C:44-3. Protracted terms could only be given to first-, second- or thirddegree offenders. Id. The lengths of the "extended term" are as follows: for first-degree
murder, between 30 and 50 years, id. § 2C:43- 7 (a)(1), for other first-degree crimes,
between 15 and 30 years, id. § 2C:43-7(a)(2), for second-degree crimes, between 8 and
15 years, id. § 2C:43-7(a)(3), and for third-degree crimes, between 5 and 8 years, id.
§ 2C:43-7(a)(4).
58 Id. § 2C:43-6(b).
59 See id. §§ 2C:44-1 to -3. These sections of the Code list various factors to be
considered by a judge in determining what sentence to impose on a defendant. Id.
Although the specific theory of justification requiring consideration of each factor may
be inferred, there is nothing which indicates which justification is entitled to the
greatest weight for any disposition. See O'Leary, supra note 50, at 561.
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overriding rationale, judges would be able to sentence offenders
within a wide dispositional range for any particular offense. This fact
is illustrated by a number of provisions. Instead of incarcerating an
offender, a court may impose up to five years of probation. 6"
Moreover, rather than tying a presumption of imprisonment to any

specific offenses, the Code requires that offenders be disposed of
"without imposing [a] sentence of imprisonment, unless" 6' certain
conditions are found to exist. 6 2 Even if the presence of one of the
conditions were to neutralize the presumption of nonimprisonment, a
court could not impose a custodial sentence without considering cer-

tain subjective facts regarding the defendant. 63 There is also a section
permitting referral of any offender to a term "of supervisory treat-

ment."6 4 Thus, the Code in fact forces judges to focus upon the offender instead of upon the offense, thereby promoting a rehabilitative approach.
In giving rehabilitation precedence over the other justifications

for criminal dispositions, the Model Penal Code belies the claim of
60 M.P.C. § 2C:45-2(a). No term of probation could exceed the maximum term of
incarceration which could have been imposed for the crime. Id. In placing a defendant
on probation, a court may, as part of its order, require that he serve 90 days in prison.
Id. § 2C:45-1(c).
61 Id. § 2C:44-1(a). Under id. § 2C:44-1(d) certain offenses are excluded from this
presumption of nonimprisonment. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
62 M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a). Thus, imprisonment is warranted in cases where it "is
necessary for protection of the public because . . . [t]here is undue risk that [the
offender] will commit another crime"; the offender needs in-patient "correctional treatment"; "a lesser sentence [would] depreciate the seriousness of the . . . crime"; or
"[t]he offense is characteristic of organized criminal activity." Id. It is significant to note
that these factors intermingle the goals of incapacitation, rehabilitation and punishment.
63 Id. § 2C:44-i(b). The judge must consider the offender's prior criminal record,
whether the offender is likely to commit another offense, how well he would respond to
probation, and whether incarceration "would entail excessive hardship." Id.
§ 2C:44-1(b)(7), (9)-(11).
6 Id. § 2C:43-12(a). The term of such treatment may not exceed one year, except
that in the case of a violent crime the limit is three years. Id. § 2C:43-13(d).
If a crime of violence is charged, a defendant requesting referral must enter a guilty
plea. Id. § 2C:43-12(b). In addition, supervisory treatment will be available only for a
first offense. Id. The defendant must be recommended for referral by "the trial court
administrator, the chief probation officer or the program director," id. § 2C:43-12(a)(2),
unless the request for referral is made by the prosecutor, id. § 2C:43-12(a)(1), rather
than by the defendant. In any case, however, referral is at the discretion of the judge.
Id. § 2C:43-12(a) ("judge . .. may postpone all further proceedings against a defendant"
(emphasis added)).
This proposed statutory pretrial intervention scheme differs from the court-created
system which is currently in operation under N.J.R. 3:28. (Current New Jersey PTI
practices are discussed at notes 25-47 supra and accompanying text.) Under the supreme court's Guideline 4, "neither informal admission nor entry of a plea of guilt" is
required for a defendant to be eligible for a PTI program. PTI Guidelines § 4.
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many of its proponents that it reduces judicial discretion. For example, an individual convicted of first-degree kidnapping 65 could be
placed on probation, 6 6 incarcerated for a basic term of eight, fifteen
or twenty years, 6 7 made ineligible for parole for one-half of the basic
term, 68 or incarcerated for an extended term of from fifteen to thirty
years 6 9 if he had twice previously been sentenced as an adult to a
custodial term for a crime involving serious personal harm, one of
these convictions having been within five years of the kidnapping. 70
The standards purporting to restrict these dispositional choices, particularly as to probation versus incarceration, are so subjective and
ambiguous as to constitute no standards at all. The hypothetical kidnapper is not to be incarcerated unless "there is undue risk . . . [he
would] commit another crime," or he needs inpatient "correctional
treatment," or "a lesser sentence [would] depreciate the seriousness
of [his] crime," or his offense is characteristic of organized criminal
activity. 7 1 Should the court find one or more of these conditions present, it would still have to consider, inter alia, the offender's prior
criminal record, whether he was likely to commit another offense,
how well he would respond to probation, and whether incarceration
72
"would entail excessive hardship."
The validity of the approach taken by the Model Penal Code,
like that taken by the New Jersey supreme court in promulgating PTI
guidelines in Leonardis, is therefore dependent upon the efficacy of
rehabilitative efforts. Yet discovering fit subjects for rehabilitation requires judges to perform the difficult task of balancing competing justifications for criminal dispositions in individual cases. It will be
shown that judges have proved unable to perform the task of balancing consistently or with rehabilitative success.
TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: REFORMATION OF OFFENDERS

Rehabilitation is based upon the belief that psychological disorders and environmental defects cause persons to commit offenses. By
identifying the causes of an individual's offense, society could provide
65 M.P.C. § 2C:13-1(c). Under the Code, kidnapping is a first-degree crime when
the victim is not released safely before the kidnapper is apprehended. Id.
66 See id. § 2C:44-1.
67 Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(1).
68 Id. § 2C:43-6(b).
69 Id. § 2C:43-7(a)( 2 ).
70Id. § 2C:44-3(a).
71Id. § 2C:44-1(a).
72 Id. § 2C:44-1(b)(7), (9)-(11).
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him with sufficient psychotherapy, reeducation and new skills to become a "reformed" and useful citizen. 73 The rehabilitative ideal came
into prominence at the beginning of the twentieth century because
lengthy incarceration based upon the goal of punishment had failed to
74
protect society.
Unfortunately, recent studies show that rehabilitation has also
failed to achieve this goal of protecting society. In New Jersey, for
example, a recent report indicates that an average of 36.5% of persons released on parole each year from 1969 through 1974 was subsequently returned to prison. 75 During fiscal years 1970 through 1975
an average of 47% of persons newly commited to state prisons had
served at least one prior term in a state prison.7 6 In fiscal year 1973,
the state's parole population of 7,620 was the source of almost 7,000
arrests for indictable, disorderly persons and juvenile offenses. 77 A
comprehensive study prepared for the Committee for the Study of
Incarceration has reviewed the results of various types of rehabilitative programs in large and small institutions and in the community.
73 N. KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 30.
74 See id. at 24, 30-31. See generally Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 93-95. For a
discussion of the historic philosophical and psychological theories which led to the rehabilitative rationale, see N. KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 20-32.
Rehabilitation has never been the goal of criminal dispositions for every offender.
For example, section 3(i) of the PTI Guidelines would ordinarily exclude from eligibility for pretrial intervention participants in organized crime and persons who breached a
public trust. The Model Penal Code suspends its presumption of nonimprisonment
for similar offenders. M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a). Although many offenders need "social,
psychological, environmental and physiological" assistance, "character and behavior retaining programs are irrelevant to many prisoners." N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 20.
Such programs will have no effect on an offender whose crime results from a rational
decision to commit a criminal act rather than from some treatable disorder. Id. at 20-21.
Nevertheless, rehabilitation has occupied a prominent place in American sentencing justifications. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), the United States
Supreme Court approved the use by a sentencing judge of information on a defendant's
background and character. The Williams Court stressed the significance of"[r]eformation
and rehabilitation" as "goals of criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 248.
75 OFFICE

OF

FISCAL

AFFAIRS,

NEW

JERSEY

STATE

LEGISLATURE,

PROGRAM

ANALYSIS OF THE NEW JERSEY PAROLE SYSTEM 82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
PROGRAM ANALYSIS]. For the three years from 1969 through 1971, approximately 24% of
all persons paroled nationwide were returned to prison. Id. at 83.
76 NEW JERSEY

CORRECTIONAL

MASTER PLAN

POLICY COUNCIL,

NEW JERSEY

CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN 74-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONAL
MASTER PLAN]. The difference between this percentage and the statistic cited at text
accompanying footnote 75 is partly accounted for by the fact that the former probably
includes some prisoners who were released at the end of their sentences, rather than on
parole at an earlier time.
77 See PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 74, 81. The total number of parolee
arrests for that year was 7,867, which included arrests for several additional categories
of offenses. Id. at 81.
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The results show that although isolated programs produced some rehabilitated offenders, in few programs did enrolled offenders have
rates of recidivism consistently lower than comparable unenrolled
offenders. 7 8 One commentator has speculated that the advancing age
of offenders while incarcerated, rather than the rehabilitative programs, might itself be responsible for even this minimal reduction in
recidivism. 79 A compilation of 231 studies which was prepared from
1966 to 1970 by the New York Governor's Special Committee on
Criminal Offenders reached the same conclusions: "[w]ith few and
isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported
80
so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."
Contrary to conclusions reached by the Leonardis court, even
studies relied upon in that opinion" l indicate that it is impossible to
conclude that existing pretrial intervention programs have reduced
recidivism. 8 2 The risk of recidivism permitted by the programs relied
upon in Leonardis is less than that presented by New Jersey's PTI
programs, because participation in the former was limited to unemployed defendants without significant records or prior incarceration,
"and exclud[ed] crimes of violence, majority property crimes and ad-

Greenburg, The Correctional Effects of Corrections: A Survey of Evaluations, in
& PUNISHMENT 140-41 (to be published Sept. 1977); see A. VON HIRSCH,
supra note 8, at 14-18; Greenburg, supra at 111-40.
71 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 13. It has been observed that the older a
person is when released from prison, the greater is the likelihood that he will avoid
being arrested and incarcerated again. D. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG US 51 (1976);
78

CORRECTIONS

see L.

WILKINS, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEASURES

55-56 (1969).

80 Martinson, What Works?--Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INTEREST 22, 23-25 (1974) (emphasis deleted).
81 71 N.J. at 94-95, 363 A.2d at 326. The court utilized the following sources:
NATIONAL

COMM'N

ROADS-PHASE

FOR

CHILDREN

&

YOUTH,

FINAL

REPORT:

PROJECT

CROSS-

1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT CROSSROADS]; NATIONAL PRE-

TRIAL INTERVENTION

SERV. CENTER, DESCRIPTIVE PROFILES ON SELECTED PRETRIAL

CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (1974); VERA INST. OF JUST., THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as
VERA INST.]; Comment, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control,

10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 180 (1975); Note, Pretrial Intervention Programs--An Innovative Reform of the Criminal Justice System, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Innovative Reform]; Note, PretrialDiversion from the Criminal Process,
83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974). See 71 N.J. at 94-95, 363 A.2d at 326.
82 See, e.g., PROJECT CROSSROADS, supra note 81, at 3, 19, Document Resume (sample too small; limited to age group between 16 and 25); VERA INST., supra note 81, at
44-45, 61 (not "a true experimental design"; study conducted "ex post facto"; sample
too small; "too early to determine ... long-range effects" (emphasis in original)). See
also Comment, supra note 81, at 199 ("reliable control groups" not established by PTI
programs).
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dicted defendants." 8 3 Inclusion of such offenders in New Jersey PTI
programs and in rehabilitative sentences meted out under the Model
Penal Code makes it probable that the participants' rate of recidivism
will be significantly higher in this state. Indeed, one of the commentators cited by the Leonardis court views PTI not as an alternative to
84
incarceration, but rather as an alternative to probation.
Defects of a Rehabilitative System
There are many reasons why the rehabilitative model has not
worked and cannot work. These reasons are both psychological and
practical in nature.

Psychological and Physical Impediments to Rehabilitation
One explanation for the failure of rehabilitative efforts is that a
85
patient must accept treatment voluntarily for it to be effective.
Most offenders participating in rehabilitative programs of the pretrial
or custodial variety recognize that they must appear rehabilitated, or
suffer the consequences of reinstitution of criminal proceedings or
denial of parole release. Therefore, even assuming correct diagnosis
of the personality disorder giving rise to the antisocial behavior,8 6
because participation in the prescribed treatment program is tied to
release, it is usually neither voluntary nor sincere and rarely has last87
ing effect.
83See Innovative Reform, supra note 81, at 1208 n.35 (describing the Manhattan
Court Employment Project and Project Crossroads).
84Comment, supra note 81, at 197. PTI programs are viewed in that Comment as a
method by which prosecutors can maintain greater leverage over offenders in cases
where the offenders would otherwise receive a "dismissal, fine, probation, or suspended sentence." Id.
8 See

J.

MITFORD, KIND AND

USUAL

PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS

110

(1973); N. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 17-18. Even the most coercive form of rehabilitation, aversive conditioning, has not achieved permanent success unless the offender has
shown a willingness to alter his life. This type of treatment attempts to produce a conditioned response-socially acceptable behavior-by means of aggressive suppression of
the antisocial behavior. The techniques employed range from electric shocks to surgically implanted electrodes in the subject's brain. Id. at 23-25. It has been found that
without reinforcement the conditioned response diminishes over a period of time. A.
VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 17 & n.*.
86 The "assumption [behind rehabilitation] that criminals are 'sick' in some way that
calls for 'treatment,' " is not universally accepted, and is considered by Judge Frankel to
be the primary fallacy of the rehabilitative model. M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 89.
See also AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 40-44
(1971).
87 See N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 17; J. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 170
(1975). It should be noted, however, that even among participants in coercive treatment
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In addition to being inherently coercive, most dispositions based
upon the goal of rehabilitation are psychologically harmful to the inmate; uncertainty over whether criminal proceedings will be terminated or when parole release will be granted produces counterrehabilitative anxiety. 88 Pretrial intervention programs skirt this problem
by limiting offender participation to six months; however, this limitation may in turn permit too short a period for even the best of rehabilitative programs to have much, if any, effect on an offender. 89
Under New Jersey's existing minimum-maximum sentencing structure as well as under the proposed Model Penal Code's specific term
sentencing, the sentences in effect become indeterminate, since the
New Jersey Parole Board has the authority to parole the typical inmate at any time after one-fifth of the term has been served. 90 The
resulting offender anxiety is augmented by the failure of the
Leonardis court and the state legislature to establish standards for the
essentially subjective decision of whether an offender has been rehabilitated, which is the predicate of release from a PTI program or
release on parole from an institution. 9 1
Moreover, to the extent that rehabilitative programs are conducted inside prison walls, they may be doomed to failure, since the
prison environment may be especially antithetical to the type of programs needed to foster rehabilitation. 92 Conditions are overcrowded
in New Jersey as well as across the nation, 93 with rehabilitative
programs, there will likely be some who do wish to be rehabilitated and for whom
participation is, in that sense, "voluntary."
88O'Leary, supra note 50, at 563. See also J. MITFORD, supra note 85, at 87-94.
89 See N. KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 37. Kittrie suggests that "the therapeutic needs
of the delinquent" are determinative of the amount of time needed to rehabilitate him.
Id.
9
0 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-92, -123.10, -140 (West 1964); M.P.C. § 2C:43-9(a).
Parole eligibility for first offenders currently occurs after the minimum term or after
one-third of the maximum term less credit for work assignments and good behavior. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.10 (West 1964). This typically comes out to one-fifth of the maximum term. Letter and Parole Eligibility Table from Thomas Stephens, New Jersey
Parole Board, to author (June 17, 1977) (on file at Seton Hall Law Review). Under the
Model Penal Code, parole eligibility would typically occur at one-fifth of the sentence
imposed by the judge.
91See notes 118-19, 283-88 infra and accompanying text.
92See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
93 See, e.g., id. at 325 ("overcrowding" is greatest problem in Alabama prison system); CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 76, at 85, 179 (as of July 1, 1976, New
Jersey medium/maximum facilities were functioning at 151% of standard bed capacity
and minimum facilities were functioning at 115% of capacity); N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1976, § 1, at 22, col. 8 (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration loaned 475 house
trailers to ten states, including New York and New Jersey, to relieve overcrowded conditions in states' prisons); id., Mar. 15, 1976, at 21, col. 1 (as of March 7, 1976, federal

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 1

facilities strained and programs understaffed. 94 The custodial and security requirements of prison operation are incompatible with and
have taken precedence over rehabilitative methods. 95 The harsh
realities of inmate treatment at the hands of prison guards and among
prisoners themselves are also significant negative factors. 96 It is often
suggested that society's commitment to institutional rehabilitation has
been inadequate, 97 but there are no indications that social consciousfacilities built to accommodate 21,322 inmates were holding 26,047 inmates); id., Jan.
25, 1976, § 2, at 24, col. 1 (prison officials from 17 southern states met to discuss "prison
overcrowding that . . . has reached crisis proportions").

94See Oversight Hearings on the Nature and Effectiveness of the Rehabilitation
Programs of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1972) (statement of Senator
Cook) (staff-inmate ratios in federal prisons are one teacher for every 98 inmates, one
vocational worker for every 82 inmates, one caseworker for every 102 inmates);
CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 353-54 (custody functions receive "a lion's share of
resources; activities aimed at modifying behavior and attitudes or at developing skills
often are limited or absent"); cf. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (1976) (because
of insufficient staff, guards "must spend all their time" attending to security and safety
concerns rather than to individual inmate needs).
Directors of several correctional institutions have complained that their efforts are
restricted "by a lack of resources for rehabilitation." L. DEWOLF, CRIME AND JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 59-60 (1975). Another statistic illustrating the problems facing rehabilitative
efforts in corrections institutions is that nationwide only 5% of prison budgets are allotted to treatment programs. J. MITFORD, supra note 85, at 97. A study prepared by a
group of medical personnel found that in New Jersey prisons "[t]he conditions are such
. . .that 'it is practically impossible' to make adequate clinical psychological examinations or provide the proper care." N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1973, at 60, cols. 4-6.
95 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 86, at 87; D. STANLEY,
supra note 79, at 17-19. See also K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 71-81
(1966); G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 12 (1958).
96 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 257-68 (1975); L. DEWOLF, supra note
94, at 39-40; K. MENNINGER, supra note 95, at 77-81. DeWolf states that "[ilt
is still

common practice in many prisons for the guards to beat prisoners for disobedience, lack
of respect, or offenses against other inmates." L. DEWOLF, supra at 39. In a 1974 New
Jersey case, a prisoner was convicted of murdering a fellow prisoner while they were
both patients in the prison's hospital. State v. Clark, 128 N.J. Super. 120, 122, 319 A.2d
247, 247-48 (App. Div. 1974). For other cases involving allegations of physical assault
by fellow inmates, see Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505 (10th Cir. 1969); Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 885, 889 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
97See N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 37; G. SYKES, supra note 95, at 132. Professor
Morris contends that, "[b]y and large, the public is uninterested in prison matters, except morbidly at times of riots." N. MORRIS, supra at 37. He opines that as a result of

this public apathy, politicians rarely feel constrained to raise prison reform as a political
issue since "most [politicians] are well aware that there are no votes to be gained in

penal reform; the lasting banishment of imprisonment, absent escapes and riots, is all
that a community expects political leaders to achieve in this sphere." Id.
Dr. Sykes feels that because of this lack of concern, "criminals will continue to be
confined in large groups under conditions of relative deprivation for some time to come,
regardless of the consequences." G. SYKES, supra at 132. Various factors may be responsible: "social inertia, the perhaps .. .greater economic inertia of investment in existing
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ness or budgetary and political considerations are likely to change so
as to permit the prison environment to become compatible with re98
habilitative efforts.
Disparity Resulting from the Lack of Sentencing Standards
Another criticism of using rehabilitation as a justification is that it
results in considerable unfairness. Because the rehabilitative ideal requires that dispositions fit the offender, judges are forced to possess
and use considerable discretion. 9 9 The sentencing decision is complicated by the fact that it involves not only the question of how long
the sentence should be, but also the issue of whether the offender
should be incarcerated at all. 10 0 Although judges strive to eliminate
the unjustifiable disparity which results when sentences of various
types and lengths are imposed on similar offenders, they have not
succeeded. Therefore, differences in sentences resulting from differences in characteristics neither of the offense nor of the offender continue to be a common occurrence.' 0 ' According to Judge Frankel, "it
physical facilities, or a primitive desire for vengeance." Id. Whatever reasons exist for
failing to provide adequate rehabilitative programs, as long as this situation continues to
exist, a constitutional question is raised by confining people for rehabilitative purposes.
In Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the court suggested that
"[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment
violates the very fundamentals of due process."
98 A recent article by Professor Wilkins examined the claimed successes of the program at the Maryland Institution for Defective Delinquents at Patuxent, Maryland,
which he described as having "the strongest claim to being the archetype of the ideal
'treatment model.' " Wilkins, Treatment of Offenders: Patuxent Examined, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1102, 1108 (1976). Wilkins concluded that even the apparent low recidivism
rate produced at that institution was illusory because of the follow-up standards utilized.
Id. at 1109-10, 1115-16. Thus, the Patuxent experience does not detract from the conclusion that rehabilitative methods have been unsuccessful. See id. at 1116.
99 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 27-28.
100 L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CAPLIN, & A. GELMIAN, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 1-3 (1976) (prepared for National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING
GUIDELINES].
101 M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 21; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 29-31. Professor von Hirsch suggests that sentencing judges and parole boards also respond to
management pressures, i.e., the desire to eliminate the extreme overcrowding of both
court schedules and prisons. Id. at 30; see Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 26. As a result,
disparity is increased. Persons who have committed serious offenses in the past may be
languishing in prison serving extremely long sentences, while recent serious offenders
are sentenced to a short term or to probation because the prisons are filled with these
earlier offenders. Id. In addition, guilty pleas are encouraged in most jurisdictions to
relieve congested court calendars. Such pleas result in a wide range of sentencing dispositions. See notes 266-74 infra and accompanying text. And, once an offender is in
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is not possible to avoid the impression that the judges' private senses
of good and evil are playing significant parts no matter what the law
on the books may define as the relative gravity of the several
crimes." 10 2 Individualized justice results in "a wild array of sentencing judgments without any semblance of the consistency demanded
by the ideal of equal justice."'10 3 A study of New Jersey state prison
commitments for the year ending June 30, 1973, revealed wide discrepancies from one portion of the state to another in the lengths of
incarceration to which offenders were sentenced for various crimes. 104
More importantly, substantial sentencing discretion has permitted racial and other biases to affect criminal dispositions. Mr. Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia10 5 pointed out
that since 1930, of the persons executed nationwide, 2,066 were black
and 1,751 were white, while 32 were women and 3,827 were men,
Of those prisoners executed for rape, 405 were black while only 48
were white. 10 6 Similar class-based disparity exists in New Jersey,
where a recent study indicated that among the group of persons arrested for serious offenses, nonwhites were committed to prison at
07
nearly twice the rate of whites.'
prison, the decision on when he should be paroled may be based on "institutional
bedspace." A. VON HIRSCH, supra at 30.
For the best results of an extensive sentencing experiment which concluded that there
is considerable disparity within the Second Circuit, see A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE,
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY (Federal Judicial Center 1974).
102 M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 24. See also Harris, supra note 14, at 265-66.
103 M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 7. See also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at
29-31.
104 DIVISION

OF

CORRECTION

&

PAROLE,

N.J.

DEPT.

OF

SENTENCE DISPARITY AMONG PRISON COMMITMENTS; BY COUNTY,

INST.

&

AGENCIES,

BY JUDGE, AND BY

CASE 8-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCE DISPARITY]. Two examples will illus-

trate the disparities which were uncovered. Robbers in Hudson County were sentenced
to an average maximum of 4.29 years, while in Monmouth County the average was 9.38
years. Figures on incarcerated gamblers reveal an average sentence in southern New
Jersey of 1.95 years, with the average in northern New Jersey being 2.31 years. Id.
Recognizing the existence of disparity, the State Administrative Office of the Courts
recently announced a computer study designed to produce sentencing guidelines which
would result in less disparity. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1976, § B, at 1, cols. 5-6.
105 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
106 Id. at 364-65. The studies cited are said to "indicate that while the higher rate of

execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of
racial discrimination." Id. at 364, See also id. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).
107CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 76, at 38-40. In 1975, nonwhites were

arrested eleven times more frequently than whites for violent offenses, but were sentenced to incarceration 22 times more often. Id. For nonviolent crimes, nonwhites
were arrested five times more frequently than whites, and were incarcerated six times
more often. Id. at 40. Some of the disparity can be traced to the failure of the statistics
to control for recidivists, who generally receive stiffer sentences.
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The ostensibly promising mechanism of appellate review of sentencing, proposed to eliminate unjustifiable disparity,' 0 8 has not in
fact been successful. Theoretically, an appellate tribunal should be
able to equalize sentences imposed by a multitude of judges situated
throughout a given jurisdiction. Such courts, however, have tended
to review cases on a piecemeal basis without developing an overall
sentencing policy. 10 9 As a result, there is no frame of reference to
assist appellate courts in deciding whether or not the specific sentence they are considering provides a proper basis for reversal as a
violation of the applicable standard of review. In addition, appellate
courts infrequently exercise their power to adjust sentences. A 1960
study of the Connecticut Sentence Review Division revealed that
108 See, e.g., ABA

PROJECT

ON

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

3-4 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinsupra note 94, at 213-14; M. FRANKEL, supra note 12,

RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

after cited as ABA]; L.

DEWOLF,

at 69, 75-85; W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE 227-29 (1974).

Appellate review of sentencing has been criticized as "distort[ing] the appellate
process" by subjecting appellate courts to emotional appeals, M. FRANKEL, supra at 78,
and impinging on the " 'discretion' " of the trial judge to sentence based on his personal
observation of the defendant at trial, id. at 82-83. Judge Frankel answers these criticisms by stating "that the virtues of a higher court include its separation from the ...
trial court, promoting a useful quality of cool objectivity." Id. at 79. Furthermore, he
argues, just as a trial judge's findings of fact may be reversed if " 'clearly erroneous,' "
his sentencing discretion, based on his ability "to observe the defendant . . . should not
preclude review altogether," although it may influence the type of review granted. Id.
at 83. Judge Frankel concludes that the trial judge's discretion "is an authority, within
the law [which] may be abused, and discretionary decisions may be reversed for
abuse." Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
Judge Frankel also contends that the absence of appellate review of sentences has
led some appellate courts to reverse convictions on the pretext of obscure errors committed at trial, in response to their own horror at excessive sentences imposed by trial
judges. Id. at 81-82. Although Judge Frankel also advocates the need for legislative
action "to govern the field of sentencing," id. at 84-85, he concludes that appellate
review is "[o]ne way to begin to temper the capricious unruliness of sentencing ... so
that appellate courts may proceed in their accustomed fashion to make law for this grave
subject," id. at 84.
109 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 5-7. The authors of that study con-

tend that appellate review could be useful in eliminating disparity only if guidelines
were first developed to establish general sentencing policy. Id. at 6-7, In order to avoid
confusion it is also important that a differentiation be made between the standard to be
applied in determining whether or not the trial court decision is reversible, see note 108
supra, and the criteria which should govern the sentencing decision itself. Another
criticism of appellate review as it is now practiced is that it is not "equally available to
both defense and prosecution." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra at 6. The authors state
that such equality of access must be present "[i]f a common law of sentencing is to
develop rationally." Id.
It should be noted that in the federal system, "absent reliance on improper considerations . . . or materially incorrect information . . . a sentence within statutory limits is

not reviewable." United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
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sentences were modified in approximately 8.5% of the instances in
which the sentence was appealed. 110 A New Jersey study revealed
that of 605 appeals in 1973 alleging excessive sentences, the sentencing court was affirmed in 96.7% of the cases."' Whether or not the
sentences appealed were in fact excessive, the result of the affirmances was to continue the existence of disparities.
There does not appear to be any remedy for unjustified
disparity" l2 within the system of individualized treatment advanced
by Leonardis and the Model Penal Code. The range within which
discretion could be exercised would be narrowed only slightly if the
Model Penal Code were adopted.l11 The existence of a PTI program
simply creates an additional stage at which discretion must be exercised. Under both these systems, judges will still individualize dispositions and will reconcile the competing goals of rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence and punishment on a case-by-case basis
without the help of useful standards. Judge Frankel suggests that
such a system is inappropriate on the ground that "judgments affecting consequences so grave as the length and character of sentences
should . . . be matters of law. '""a Thus he concludes that it is the
responsibility of the legislature, and not of the courts, to determine
"the legitimate bases for criminal sanctions." 1 15
If rehabilitation were retained by the legislature as one of the
justifications for criminal dispositions, it would be inconsistent to establish standards which constrict or eliminate judicial discretion to
individualize dispositions. The effort to rehabilitate particular offenders will, therefore, inevitably result in continued unjustifiable
disparity. 116
110 Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1464 (1960). One explanation for the infrequency of
sentencing alterations could be the fact that Connecticut permits sentences to be increased as well as decreased. This influences the type of criminals who contest their
sentences. Offenders who have received the harshest sentences for the crime committed
will be more likely to appeal sentences, as they have little to lose. Id.
I11 G. Cook, Sentence Review 2 (Aug. 26, 1974) (unpublished study for the New
Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts).
112 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 1-3.
113 If the Code were adopted, all inmates incarcerated under the basic sentence provisions would serve roughly equivalent time depending on the degree of the offense.
M.P.C. § 2C:43-2(a), -6. However, when extended terms, id. § 2C:43-7(a), probation, id.
§ 2C:43-2(b)(2), and parole release, id. § 2C:43-9(a), are also considered, it becomes
apparent that there will be wide sentence disparity among persons committing similar
crimes. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text.
114 M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 107.
115 Id. The author does not share this view.
11
6 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 12. Professor von Hirsch explains that sentencing disparity naturally arises because the rehabilitative "theory looks to offenders'
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Reliance upon Defective Predictive Techniques
Another criticism of dispositional decisions based upon rehabilitation is that they depend upon the prediction of an offender's future
criminal behavior in the community. 11 7 New Jersey Rule 3:28, cited
in Leonardis, permits dismissal of criminal proceedings only "upon
certification by program officials that the defendant has successfully
18
participated in the PTI program and has been rehabilitated."1
Likewise, parole release in New Jersey is presently granted an offender only if "there is reasonable probability that . . . he will assunme
his proper and rightful place in society, without violation of the law,
and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society. ''119 Both programs assume that rehabilitated offenders can be
accurately identified. Yet it can be shown that reliable determinations
20
of rehabilitation are virtually impossible to achieve.1
need for treatment rather than to the character of their crimes." Id. Therefore, the disparity can be justified only if the rehabilitative effort succeeds. Id. After discussing the
various methods used and concluding that they have so far proved ineffective, id. at
13-17, Professor von Hirsch concludes that "the rehabilitative disposition is plainly untenable," id. at 18.
117 N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 16. The ability to predict future criminal behavior
in the community based on an inmate's reactions to prison rehabilitative programs encounters two problems. Id. at 16-17. "[E]xtra-institutional factors," such as prior records, family relationships and future prospects of a home and employment "are closely
related to later avoidance of criminality." Id. at 16. As a result, "[p]rison behavior is not
a predictor of community behavior." Id. The second problem involves the compulsive
nature of most rehabilitation programs. Id. at 17; see notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
Although Morris discusses these problems in terms of predictions based on prison
behavior only, it can be assumed that similar problems arise in predicting future criminal behavior based on participation in pretrial intervention programs. The participant in
such programs is subject to the same outside factors such as employment and family
relationships, and has a similar desire to appear rehabilitated in order to have the
charges against him dismissed.
1s 71 N.J. at 105, 363 A.2d at 331-32; see N.J.R. 3 :2 8(c)(1).
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.14 (West 1970).
120 See A. VON HIRscH, supra note 8, at 22-25; cf. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failtre of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear & Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1097-99 (1976) (psychiatric predictions of dangerousness found
to be inaccurate). See generally N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 31-34.
Empirical evidence of the inaccuracy of dangerousness predictions resulted from
two important Supreme Court decisions. In 1966, in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107,
110 (1966), the Court held that a prisoner who was certified insane while in prison was
nevertheless entitled to a jury determination of his sanity upon the'expiration of his
sentence. As a direct consequence of this decision, 967 " 'Baxstrom patients' " were
released from New York institutions for the criminally insane or transferred to civil
institutions. N. MORRIS, supra at 69; see Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1090. Although
these ex-convicts were predicted to be dangerous if released, N. MORRIS, supra at 69, a
study four years later found that "[o]nly two percent [had been] returned to the institu-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 1

Traditionally, predictions of recidivism have been made intuitively. For example, the former United States Board of Parole and
the State Parole Board used virtually no explicit criteria in determining whom and when to release.' 2 ' More recently, in order to reduce
the number of disparate parole decisions, the present United States
Parole Commission has formalized the process. The Commission has
begun using a matrix including both offense and offender characteristics' 2 2 and excluding any characteristics relating to rehabilitation. 1 23
Even under this new technique, however, predictions as to individual
offenders can fail in two ways: by failing to identify future offenders,
and by retaining under social control offenders who pose no risk of
committing future offenses.' 2 4 These failures illustrate that even the
most accurate predictions of recidivism do not reveal the percentage
of offenders falsely predicted to be probable recidivists,12 5 and

tions for the criminelly insane," fewer than twenty-six percent had been assaultive in
civil mental institutions, and fewer than sixteen percent of those released to the community (about which there was sufficient information) had been rearrested. Id. at 70.
The study therefore was illustrative of the failure of the predictions of dangerousness.
Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1090, 1093.
Following the 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963),
which deter-mined the right to counsel of indigents prosecuted by a state, a number of
Florida prisoners who had not been afforded this right were released. Singer, supra
note 13, at 84. Although no formal prediction of recidivism was involved, a study which
followed these releasees showed a "recidivism rate . .. one-half that of prisoners who
served their maximum sentence." Id.
121 See PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 18-30; D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at
27; Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J.
810, 820 & n.44 (1975).
122 See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). See generally notes 139-44 infra and accompanying
text.
123See Project, supra note 121, at 873-74.
124 N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 66-67. To illustrate the two types of failures, Morris has developed a hypothetical example concerning 100 incarcerated offenders whose
future criminality must be predicted by a parole board. See id. at 67. He begins by
assuming that all 100 offenders are released. Of those, 30 are predicted to recidivate,
and 20 ultimately do. Of the 70 who are predicted "rehabilitated," 5 recidivate. Thus,
there are 10 inmates incorrectly predicted to recidivate and 5 inmates falsely predicted
to be cured. Id. In a real situation, the entire sample would not be released. As a result,
the 10 individuals who are falsely predicted to be recidivists would be retained in custody unnecessarily, see id., while the 5 falsely predicted rehabilitated would be free to
victimize society once again. See also E. TUFTE, DATA ANALYSIS FOR POLITICS AND
POLICY 36-40 (1974).
125See Project, supra note 121, at 875 & n.319. Since inmates predicted to recidivate will remain incarcerated, it is impossible to determine how many of them are, in
fact, rehabilitated. Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717, 738 (1972); see A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 25; Project, supra at 875.
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"can[not] predict whether a given individual will" recidivate or
not. 126
Given the risks of recidivism the natural tendency is to overpredict the percentage of offenders who will recidivate.1 27 By predicting that all offenders will recidivate, 100% of the potential recidivists
will remain incarcerated, but the cost of this approach, of course, is
to overincarcerate large numbers of rehabilitated (or safe) offenders.
Overincarceration: Practical and Philosophical Ramifications
It might be claimed that the desire to protect public safety justifies the prolonged retention under social control of an indeterminate
number of persons who will not commit future violent crimes in the
effort to retain those who will.1 28 Such an effort, however, would be

counterrehabilitative. Rehabilitated offenders who are incarcerated
beyond the time required to rehabilitate them may become embittered and frustrated when ultimately released. 129 In addition, all incarcerated offenders would be likely to lose the external incentive to
attempt rehabilitation if they were to see rehabilitated offenders
nonetheless being retained in institutions.
Although the injustice of overincarceration is readily apparent
from the viewpoint of the overincarcerated offender, this injustice can
be demonstrated on a philosophical level as well. John Rawls recently
devised a game theory involving ideal, rational people who could divorce themselves from their own personal situation in attempting to

126

Project, supra note 121, at 875-76 n.320 (emphasis in original); accord, Hoffman

& Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 203
(1974). See also L. WILKINS, supra note 79, at 126-29. For a detailed discussion of the
operation of the United States Parole Commission's recidivism prediction system, see
notes 139-44 infra and accompanying text.
127 N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 68; Singer, supra note 13, at 84. For an article
opposing the use of preventive confinement, see Von Hirsch, supra note 125.
128 An extension of this argument, which would appeal to those who lear the release
at the end of their terms of offenders who have committed serious crimes, is to utilize
capital punishment for all violent offenders. A less dramatic extension of the argument
is to urge incarceration of all violent offenders until their fiftieth birthday. Such proposals may be considered excessive and unjust under some persons' definition of justice.
Logically, however, the overincarceration of offenders wrongly predicted to recidivate is
no different. For the concept of justice adopted in this article, see notes 130-34 ilifra
and accompanying text.
129 Such inmates may, therefore, be more prone to commit crimes. See Comment,
supra note 81, at 190. The low degree of recidivism found to have resulted when Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), prompted the early release of a large group of
prisoners, supports the conclusion that overincarceration may indeed increase criminal
propensities. See Singer, supra note 13, at 84-85.
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construct a just society.13 0 The game theory postulates that each of
these people is in an "original position" preceding the creation of
social institutions, and that they make choices as to the structure of
those institutions from "behind a veil of ignorance," that is, knowing
the general facts about human society, but ignorant of their own
status, abilities or psychological inclinations. l 3 ' The choices which
would be made by people in this ideal situation, and upon which all
future social arrangements would be based, define what Rawls considers to be "the principles of justice. '"132 Rawls' rational person,
theoretically removed from the personal consequences of his choices,

would reject a system of social control which would demand undeserved sacrifice of him, unless there were "compensating benefits" for
all members of society. 13 3 In view of the failure of rehabilitative ef130 See

J.

RAWLS, supra note 8, at 4. Professor Rawls' basic premise is that "the

primary subject of justice is .. .the way in which the major social institutions distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social
cooperation." Id. at 7.
131 Id. at 12. The "original position" is a "hypothetical situation" designed to eliminate social considerations that would prevent an unbiased decision. Id. Professor Rawls
postulates more specifically as to the "original position" that
[a]mong the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the
good or their special psychological propensities.
Id. Rawls describes such individuals as acting "behind a veil of ignorance," in order to
guarantee "'that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by
the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances." Id.; see N.
MORRIS,supra note 18, at 81-82.
For more extended discussion of "original position" and of the "veil of ignorance,"
see J. RAWLS, supra at 11-22, 118-92; Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 534, 535 (1973).
132 J.RAWLS, supra note 8, at 4, 11. Rawls further defines these
principles of justice for the basic structure of society [as] the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be
established.
Id. at 11.
133 Id. at 14-15. In particular, Rawls would require compensating benefits "for the
least advantaged members of society." Id. He asserts that
[alll social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.
Id. at 303; see id.at 298-303. See generally id. at 60-67. A rational person might acquiesce in such a sacrifice if the incapacitation of potential recidivists or the deterrent
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forts to produce "compensating benefits," the rational person would
not agree to sanctions beyond those necessary to punish or rehabilitate him, merely to prevent the release of others who were not rehabilitated. Therefore, the retention of safe offenders in the name of
34
rehabilitation would be unjust under Rawls' formulation.1
Conclusion
It may be concluded that rehabilitation has failed,
doomed to perpetual failure for the psychological
reasons discussed herein. Thus, depriving offenders of
attempt to rehabilitate and to incapacitate potential

and that it is
and practical
liberty in the
recidivists is

effect upon others could be shown to make him safer in the long run. The possibility of
these compensating benefits in connection with justifications other than rehabilitation
will be discussed at notes 147-71 infra and accompanying text.
It should be noted that since the problem of overincarceration is one created "by
the state under claim of right," it is therefore different from the problem of victimization
by recidivists. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 25. Nevertheless, the argument that the
overincarceration of rehabilitated offenders should be tolerated to protect society from
recidivists is potent emotionally and politically. A compromise approach not recommended by the author could nevertheless be reached by distinguishing among crimes,
rather than adopting the Model Penal Code's generalized concern over the "risk . . . the
defendant will commit another crime." M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(1). For first- and seconddegree offenders the costs of victimization might outweigh the cost of overincarceration,
but for third- and fourth-degree offenders the balance might be different. See O'Leary,
supra note 50, at 574 (relying upon Wilkins, Current Aspects of Penology: Directions
for Corrections, 118 PROCEEDINGS AM. PHIL. Soc'y 235, 241-43 (1974)). See also L.
WILKINS, supra note 79, at 125-29. Thus, if they cannot be eliminated altogether, predictions of recidivism or dangerousness might be limited to certain classes of offenders
who have committed particularly heinous offenses.
134A legal formulation of the Rawls position is the less drastic means test. See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The essence of the test is that when confronted with an intrusion upon one's fundamental constitutional rights, such as life or
liberty, the ends of the state must be legitimate and compelling and the means employed to achieve those ends must be the least drastic available. The Court stated that
"[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose." Id.; see Singer, supra note 13, at 55-56;
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1102 & n.154,
1122 (1969). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970). Overincarceration of rehabilitated offenders cannot be said to be the least drastic means of protecting
society from recidivists.
Even where fundamental rights are not involved the Court has required that procedures adopted by a legislature to achieve a legitimate legislative goal be rationally related to that goal. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 23-24 (1972). Since the inability to predict recidivism accurately results in a
lack of rational relationship between the means employed and the end desired-protection of society-incarceration in the name of rehabilitation is impermissible.
For a discussion and comparison of these two tests, see Singer, supra note 13, at
55-59.
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unjust,13 5 as is the unexplained disparity in sentences meted out to
similar offenders. 136 To the extent that rehabilitative efforts are continued, they should not be used to justify an offender's disposition or
to determine the timing of his release from custody or confinement.
INCAPACITATION: PROTECTION FROM DANGEROUS OFFENDERS

Incapacitation as a justification for dispositions requires incarceration of an offender if, in the words of the Model Penal Code, "[tlhere
is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime."' 13 7 This consideration requires a parole-release decisionmaker to predict dangerousness
or recidivism in the offender who is already incarcerated. In this respect, incapacitation resembles rehabilitation. The difference between
them is that no effort to reform an offender is necessary to advance
the incapacitative rationale for a disposition. Moreover, the incapacitative prediction is different from the prediction inherent in the
justification of rehabilitation in that the former focuses only on information about the offender's life prior to sentencing, and does not
consider rehabilitative progress subsequent to that time. Therefore,
the prediction required for incapacitation need be made only once, at
that point when an offender's disposition through pretrial intervention, probation or incarceration is determined. It need not be re-

peated as an offender, under social control, participates in programs,
learns new skills, receives therapy or simply ages. This incapacitative
prediction can thus be made with more confidence because it is
135 Not only are such deprivations unjust, but the attempt to rehabilitate when coupled with the wish to control also gives rise to the possibility of totalitarianism. N.
MORRIS, supra note 18, at 9-11. In addition, the belief that the goal of rehabilitation
justifies social control raises a concern over the likelihood of "an increase in the
number of citizens who are brought under social control," id. at 9, since probation and
parole continue social restraints on offenders for considerable time periods, and expose
offenders to substantial risks of future incarceration through revocation procedures. See
also Comment, supra note 81, at 197.
For a more extensive discussion of the potential abuses of a "therapeutic state," see
N. KITTRIE,supra note 13, at 1-45, 340-71.
136 The implication of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), which held
the death penalty unconstitutional as applied in the cases then under consideration, was
that the death penalty may not be imposed arbitrarily. See id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 255-57 (Brennan, J., concurring). As a result of this opinion, it is possible
that other types of sentences may also be considered unconstitutional when arbitrarily
applied.
137M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(1); see A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 19-20. As dissatisfaction with rehabilitation as a justification increases, incapacitation becomes more acceptable as an alternative. The argument is made that " [elven if the capacity for cure is
lacking . . .the public can be protected by identifying potential recidivists and holding
them as long as they are likely to commit further crimes." Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
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based on objective facts which have already occurred, and is not a
speculation as to how an offender may have changed-or appear to
have changed-as a result of rehabilitative efforts.
While parole boards have traditionally attempted to assess an
offender's rehabilitation,138 the United States Parole Commission has
recently been making parole release decisions on the basis of a matrix
which facilitates an incapacitative decision. 13 9 One axis of the matrix
contains scores compiled as a result of the presence or absence of
certain offender characteristics: prior convictions, prior incarcerations,
age at first commitment, whether the offense involved auto theft,
prior parole revocation, drug history, employment record, education,
and living arrangement contemplated upon release.140 Those scoring
the best as to these factors have the best prognosis for a successful
parole period. 14 1 The other axis contains six categories of offense
142
severity derived from a grouping of the federal criminal offenses.
The intersection of an inmate's offender characteristics and offense
severity is a cell in the matrix. Inmates with a good prognosis based
upon offender characteristics are paroled earlier than those with a
poorer prognosis; those with the best prognosis based upon offender characteristics and the lowest offense severity are paroled earliest
of all. 143 Through use of the matrix, the Parole Commission has had

considerable success in predicting groups of inmates who do not
44
recidivate when released.1
Because most of the offender characteristics considered for parole
will also have been present at the time of sentencing, it has been
138Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 91. See also notes 284-88 infra and accompanying

text.
13928 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976); see Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126; Project, supra
note 121.
140 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). The composite grade of characteristics is denominated a
salient factor score. See id.
141 See id.; Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126, at 202. The prisoner's score on the
matrix is totaled and on this basis the prisoner is placed within one of four defined
categories. The categories are "Very good"-a score of nine to eleven, "Good"-a score
of six to eight, "Fair"-a score of four to five, and "Poor"-a score of zero to three. 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976).
142 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976) (low, low moderate, moderate, high, very high, greatest).
143See id.; Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126, at 200.
144See Hoffman & Beck, Salient Factor Score Validation-A 1972 Release Cohort, 4
J. CIM. JUST. 69, 71, 74 (1976); Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126, at 202. These studies
evaluated prediction success by considering the subject's record after his release from
prison. Two classifications were developed in order to interpret the results: Favorable
Outcome or Unfavorable Outcome. These classifications were based upon whether or
not the parolee had committed technical violations and been returned to prison, had
been convicted of a new offense with a greater sentence than sixty days, or had absconded. Id. at 196.
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suggested that a similar matrix could be utilized by sentencing
judges. 145 Use of such a matrix would reduce existing disparity in
offender dispositions. In addition, it would predict more successfully
groups of offenders likely to recidivate than would predictions based
upon rehabilitative progress. Nevertheless, the problem of overincarcerating the safe offenders within groups predicted as likely recidivists remains, 146 as does the problem of failing to recognize dangerous persons among groups of offenders predicted not to recidivate.
Whether or not it is just to impose a burden upon specific offenders who need not be incapacitated in order to retain control over
groups of individually unidentifiable offenders who do require in-

capacitation depends upon whether every member of society derives
a resulting benefit.

14 7

The delayed release of a group of offenders

known to include recidivists results in a real reduction in crime. Yet
the reduction has been viewed as minor,1 48 perhaps because even the
recidivists will ultimately be released and because offenders needlessly retained develop criminal propensities while incarcerated that
they would not otherwise possess.' 4 9 Additionally, not all recidivists
commit serious crimes. Thus, although incapacitation should be con145 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at xii-xiii; see Hoffman & DeGostin,

supra note 12, at 198-201. The sentencing matrix developed by the Sentencing
Guidelines is similar to that used by the United States Parole Commission. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra at xii. Experimental use of this matrix has occurred in four jurisdictions. See id. at 28-31; N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1976, at 30, col. 6.
146The choice of the particular nine factors employed in the Parole Commission's
matrix excludes other factors which might prove only marginally less successful, such as
the offender's marital status or whether or not he came from a broken home. Some
inmates might score poorly on the factors used, but well on the factors discarded. See
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 23-28; Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126,
at 196. It follows, therefore, that whichever test is employed, a number of safe offenders
will remain unidentified and will not be paroled.
Of particular importance if such a matrix were to be applied to sentencing is the
validity of the sample used to construct the matrix. The Board of Parole developed its
salient factors by canvassing inmates released in largely arbitrary fashion. Those inmates already possessed factors that appealed in unarticulated fashion to the Board of
Parole. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 126, at 196-97. To increase the validity of the
sample, and to reduce the number of false positives, the entire prison population should
be included in constructing the sample. In terms of sentencing, the sample used to
construct a predictive matrix should be all offenders guilty of a crime, not merely offenders guilty of a crime who have been incarcerated and paroled, particularly in light of
the disparity which exists in sentences meted out to members of different groups. See
note 107 supra.
147 See J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 3-6, 61. In United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
458 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized incapacitation of offenders posing a serious
risk to society as a legitimate goal of sentencing. See Project, supra note 121, at 872-76.
148 See Project, supra note 121, at 875.
149 This fact was illustrated by the follow-up study of defendants prematurely released in the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 135 (1963). See note 120 supra.
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sidered in defining offenses and determining the sentences each type
of offense should bear, it should not be considered in making individual dispositional decisions. When doubt exists as to the distribution of burdens to be borne by individuals, the priority of individual
liberty should prevail.150 The justice of a system of dispositions based
upon incapacitation is therefore in question, although less so than one
15 1
based upon rehabilitation.
Incapacitation, even as expressed in the Model Penal Code, has
never been advocated as a legitimate goal for all offenders. 152 Rather,
it has been advanced as a goal for those who could not be rehabilitated, such as members of criminal syndicates. 153 Theoretically, for
incapacitation to work properly, incarceration would have to exceed
the maximum permissible sentence for those offenders who are still
considered dangerous even at the end of their terms. 154 With exile
abandoned and life imprisonment meaning substantially less than it
implies, 155 only capital punishment is certain to incapacitate beyond
the point of such an offender's dangerousness. In modern American
history such a drastic disposition has only been promulgated and
permitted for limited serious offenses. 156
150 J.RAWLS, supra note 8, at 43. Rawls suggests that "liberty can be restricted only
for the sake of liberty." He expresses two conditions: "(a) a less extensive liberty must
strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all; (b)a less than equal liberty must be
acceptable to those with lesser liberty." Id. at 302.
151 See notes 130-34 supra and accompanying text.
152 See State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 199-201, 162 A.2d 851, 852-53 (1960). The Ivan
opinion noted that '[flew would permanently isolate the offender without regard to the
nature of his crime upon a finding of incorrigibility." Id. at 200, 162 A.2d at 852. The
Model Penal Code has a presumption of nonimprisonment, but that presumption is
overcome if "[tihere is undue risk that . ..the defendant will commit another crime."
M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(a)(1). The Code still requires, however, that "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character and condition of the defendant," id., as
well as certain mitigating factors, id. § 2C:44-1(b), be considered in determining the
need for incarceration.
153See M.P.C. §§ 2C:44-1(a)(4), -3(b); cf. PTI Guidelines § 3(i) (a defendant involved in "organized criminal activity" should normally be barred from the PTI program unless he can establish "his amenability to the rehabilitative process," as well as
"compelling reasons justifying his admission and ... that a decision against enrollment
would be arbitrary and unreasonable").
154 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 22 n.*.
155 A first offender sentenced to life imprisonment in New Jersey is eligible for
parole at the end of approximately fourteen years of incarceration, assuming good behavior and maximum use of work credits. PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 21, 24.
156 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 45 U.S.L.W. 4584, 4584-85 (U.S. June 6, 1977)
(per curiam) (mandatory death sentence impermissible for murder of peace officer if no
consideration of possible mitigating circumstances); Washington v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
906 (1976) (summary order vacating death penalty imposed in that case as cruel and
unusual punishment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-34 (1976) (plurality opin-
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DETERRENCE

It has long been thought by many commentators that a criminal
penalty meted out to any one offender to a certain extent deters criminality on the part of other potential offenders.1 57 General deterrence
as a goal of criminal dispositions assumes that offenders rationally de58
cide in advance upon the costs and rewards of criminal behavior.'
This premise is antithetical to that underlying the justification of
rehabilitation-that psychological disorder or environmental defect,
rather than a deliberate weighing of positive and negative factors,
causes persons to commit offenses.159 Each of these assumptions is
partially correct: although many offenders are insensitive to "costs
ion) (abridging scope of capital offense does not cure constitutional infirmity); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death
sentences rejected by society as unfair and arbitrary); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
176-87 (1976) (plurality opinion) (death penalty not per se unconstitutional, but proportionality to crime committed must be considered); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
286, 296-98 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (American standards have severely limited
use of death penalty; arbitrary imposition is " 'cruel and unusual' punishment"). The
Supreme Court has now held that the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional as a
violation of the eighth amendment. Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866 (1977).
157 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 37-44; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS
DETERRENCE 1-5 (1973); see Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 953-56, 973 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Punishment]. But see
Antunes & Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for
CriminalJustice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145, 146 (1973); Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REV. 117, 125 (1958). The reasons proffered for the split
between deterrence advocates and opponents are that there have not been adequate
empirical studies to support either side effectively. A. VON HIRSCH, supra at 40-44; B.
WOOTTON,

CRIME

AND

THE CRIMINAL

LAW:

REFLECTIONS

OF A

MAGISTRATE

AND

SOCIAL SCIENTIST 96 (1963); Punishment, supra at 953; Antunes & Hunt, supra at
145-46; and that each side argues in too general a sense, F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
supra at 4-5; Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 176, 181-82 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Illusion]; cf. Gardiner, supra at 123 (deterrence "works less through fear of punishment itself, than through fear of social disapprobation"). John Stuart Mill suggested that those on each side of the argument select
examples to fit the concept of justice which they propose, without considering the examples of the other side. J. MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 51-52 (1910).
In order for criminal penalties to act as effective deterrents, it is essential that the
public have knowledge of them, F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra at 142, that the
members of the public believe that the penalties are applicable to their behavior, id. at
158, and that they believe in the capability of the authorities to enforce the penalties,
id. at 160. See also notes 170-71 infra and accompanying text.
158 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 86, at 55-56; B.
WOOTTON, supra note 157, at 97-100; Gardiner, supra note 157, at 122; Punishment,
supra note 157, at 950-51; cf. id. at 955 (deterrence has some effect even when behavior
is irrational).
59See J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at 175; cf. Gardiner, supra note 157, at 123
(certain types of offenders act only impulsively and are unaffected by punishment).

19761

CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS

and benefits," others may be influenced by such calculations. 160
It is uncertain which individual criminal acts could be deterred
or how severe a penalty is needed to deter their commission. Deterrence is useful, however, in determining which general crimes ought
to be prohibited, and, in a general way, how severe the sanctions for
violations should be. For example, it is widely believed that persons
committing murders ought to be punished. This belief extends to
persons murdering members of their families in spite of indications
that such offenders will not recidivate, x6 1 and that punishment is
162
therefore unnecessary either to rehabilitate or to incapacitate them.
Deterrence is generally considered a utilitarian goal in that it
serves to maximize social well-being.163 Although most utilitarians believe that "all punishment . . . is evil," 1 64 they make the important
point that punishment may be used to maximize society's protection
provided that the by-product is "the minimum aggregate suffering. '"165 Inasmuch as it focuses on the greater good of society, the
utilitarian view is unconcerned with the distribution of benefits and
burdens to individual members of that society. 166 Thus, the general
deterrence rationale which this theory underlies is not useful to
67
judges in achieving justice in individual cases. 1
160J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at 176-77; see Punishment, supra note 157, at 950,
963. The measure of the deterrent effect upon a particular offender depends upon the
type of offense to which he is attracted, his emotional state in making the decision to
offend, his motivation toward the specific crime, and deterrent factors other than criminal penalties. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 157, at 131; see id. at 128-41; cf.
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 86, at 57 ("[flor most people, the
influence of upbringing, education, and conscience will prevent serious crime regardless of what criminal law may say or do about it").
161J. MITFORD, supra note 85, at 276-77; cf. N. KITTRUE, supra note 13, at 195
(homicide offenders have lowest rate of recidivism).
162 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 355 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
163See Bentham, Punishment and Utility, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 66
(J. Murphy ed. 1973). The theory of utility is that every person desires happiness and
thus tries to maximize his own happiness. J. MILL, supra note 157, at 11-12. True
utilitarianism seeks to maximize the happiness of society as a whole, rather than to
maximize the happiness of individuals. Id. at 10, 16; see J.RAWLS, supra note 8, at 26;
cf. Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments, in A. MANZONI, THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 14
(1964) (laws sacrifice liberty in order for society to be secure). See also Rawls, supra
note 14.
164 Bentham, supra note 163, at 68.
165A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 50; see J. MILL, supra note 157, at 48-49;
Bentham, supra note 163, at 67-68. This use of punishment is consistent with achieving
the overriding "public conception of justice," which is "the fundamental charter of a
well-ordered human association." J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 4-5; see id. at 26.
166 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 86, at 55; J. RAWLS,
supra note 8, at 22-24.
167 See J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 3-4; A. VON HIRSCH, su pra note 8, at 50-51.
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As an illustration, it would be possible for a judge to accomplish
the goals of a deterrence system by punishing an individual who is
not guilty, since publication of the sentence could deter others regardless of the sentenced person's innocence. 168 Moreover, if deterrence were the central justification for criminal dispositions, the imposition of a penalty upon one committing an undeterrable crime,
such as a passionate murder, 169 would be necessary. Penalizing
such an act causes suffering to the individual offender which is not
outweighed by a compensating benefit to society. In such cases,
punishment would result in less social satisfaction, not more.
There is considerable agreement that "the certainty of punishment" for all offenders is more important than is the magnitude of
punishments meted out to individuals; 170 whether or not an increRawls and von Hirsch conclude that it is unjust to sacrifice the welfare of individuals
for the general good of society. J. BAWLS, supra at 3-4; A. VON HIRSCH, supra at 50-51;
cf. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 86, at 55 (general deterrence

does not consider "the effects of punishment upon the subsequent career of someone
who has been punished"); B. WOOTTEN, supra note 157, at 92 (not possible to evaluate
whether individual dispositions have contributed to the overriding objective). See also
I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (Ladd trans. 1965) ("human
being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else").
As one of the most fundamental premises of his philosophy, Rawls states that
[ejach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that
the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others.
It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are
not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
J. BAWLS, supra at 3-4.
168 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 51 n.*.
169See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 157, at 138. Zimring and Hawkins

note "that crimes committed for material gain are more susceptible to deterrence than
crimes of passion such as homicide and assault . . . because crimes of passion are associated with higher levels of emotional arousal." Id.
170 Antunes & Hunt, supra note 157, at 158; Punishment, supra note 157, at 964; see
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 61-63; J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at 174; Gardiner,
supra note 157, at 123-24. But cf. id. at 125 ("prevention of crime involves wider issues
than either severity . . . or certainty"). In 1764, Cesare Beccaria suggested that the
certainty of punishment was of primary importance because "[t]he certainty of being
punished, however lightly, always makes a stronger impression than the fear of another
worse punishment, associated with a hope that it will not be inflicted." Beccaria, supra
note 163, at 57; accord, Punishment, supra at 964, cf. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 594 (1977) (increased public knowledge of
likelihood of detection and conviction of certain types of crime deters commission of
that crime). One commentator, however, relates that some studies have shown that it is
"the combination of certainty and severity of punishment" that serves as an effective
deterrent. D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at 10 (emphasis in original).
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ment in deterrence results from an increase in the severity of individual penalties is open to serious question. 171 The Leonardis court
did not consider the goal of deterrence. If it had so considered, the
court might have had to conclude that although some liberty is deprived by participation in pretrial intervention programs, for some of
the eligible crimes the "benefits" of the crime to a potential offender
would exceed the "costs" of participation. The commission of such
crimes might therefore be encouraged by the increased availability of
PTI programs.
PUNISHMENT, OR JUST DESERTS

One of the early origins of the modern theory of just deserts is
Immanuel Kant's philosophy that a person should be punished when
he deserves it and because he deserves it, the degree of punishment
being determined by the gravity of the offense. 172 Kant's view is
171See J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at 175. Compare Punishment, supra note 157,
at 970 with Antunes & Hunt, supra note 157, at 158. As severity increases, the resulting
extra increment of deterrence may become so minimal as to be not worth the costs of
maintaining a prisoner through the extra period of incarceration. J. Q. WILSON, supra
at 179; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 157, at 208-09; Antunes & Hunt, supra
at 160. In addition, it should be noted that the public has only a sketchy appreciation of
how severity of punishment may function as a general deterrent. See Punishment, supra
at 970. Thus, if the penalty for a particular crime seems too severe, an offender may not
be convicted at all, in preference to giving him a harsh sentence. J. Q. WILSON, supra at
179; Punishment, supra at 970.
In the extreme case of severity-capital punishment-some studies have indicated
that the death penalty is no more of a deterrent than lengthy incarceration, see A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 39, and even sophisticated statistical and econometric studies
of the death penalty have failed to establish a consensus on its deterrent effect. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976) ("results simply . . . inconclusive"). Compare
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) with Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac
Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187, 206 (1975) and Peck, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359, 367
(1976).
172 See I. KANT, supra note 167, at 99-107; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 6. Kant
reasoned that an individual's "innate personality [that is, his right as a person]" prevents society from punishing him for any other reason than his commission of an offense. I. KANT, supra at 100 (brackets in original). As this is the only acceptable justification, it is wrong to use punishment to accomplish a private goal "for the criminal
himself or for civil society." Id. The offender "must first be found to be deserving of
punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of this punishment for himself for his fellow citizens." Id. (emphasis added).
In determining the severity of the punishment, Kant argued that "the principle of
equality," which he further described as the "retributive principle of returning like for
like," is the governing standard. Id. at 101. Under Kant's reasoning, therefore, a murderer must be put to death; otherwise "there is . . . no equality between the crime and
the retribution." Id. at 102.
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based upon the theory that each member of society has undertaken a
reciprocal obligation to limit his own behavior. 173 In violating the
criminal law, a member of society obtains an "unfair advantage" over
the other members of society. Punishment of the offender is necessarv to remove the "unfair advantage" he has obtained, 174 even if the
punishment benefits no one in terms of rehabilitation or deterrence,
and even if there is no need to incapacitate the offender. 175 Professor
von Hirsch has noted that by focusing on the past, the just deserts
model differs "from the other purported aims of punishment-deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation-which seek to justify the crim''7
inal sanction by its prospective usefulness in preventing crime. 6
Kant and von Hirsch have utilized the principle of proportionality to establish the severity of the punishment to be meted out to
offenders. They suggest that grievous crimes ought to bear harsher
penalties than minor crimes.' 77 If they do not, criminals may choose
to commit serious crimes instead of minor ones, thereby reaping the
greatest advantage possible for the same penalty. Beyond the requirement that crimes be punished proportionately to each other, it
is important that the most grievous crimes bear grievous penalties in
173 1. KANT, supra note 167, at 64-65; see id. at 36-37. Kant argued, for example,
that secure personal ownership of property would be impossible without members of
society entering into such a reciprocal obligation, since an individual's undertaking to
respect the property of others derives its obligatory nature from their implied promise to
do the same. Id. at 64.
Kant's philosophy on this issue is a reformulation of Rousseau's social contract. See
Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 217, 225 (1973); J.
ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 13-16, 29,
30 (1950). Rousseau defined the "social compact" as a contract in which " '[e]ach of us
puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part
of the whole.' " Id. at 15 (emphasis deleted). The result of "the social compact [is to set]
up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions." Id. at 30.
Under Rawls' conception of the contract, "the principle of equal liberty" is given
priority. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 244. Thus "liberty can be restricted only for the sake
of liberty itself." Id. See generally notes 130-34 supra and accompanying text.
174 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 47-48; Murphy, supra note 173, at 228. Murphy
derives the concept of the "unfair advantage" obtained by the criminal from an analysis
of Kant's theory of reciprocal obligations. ld.; see note 173 supra and accompanying
text. This reciprocity makes "it ... important to guarantee that those who disobey [the
law] will not gain an unfair advantage over those who do obey voluntarily." Murphy,
supra at 228. The "unfair advantage" obtained by the criminal thus consists of his "not
bearing the burden of self-restraint" exercised by the other members of society. Id.
175 See I. KANT, supra note 167, at 100-01.
176 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 46.
177See I. KANT, supra note 167, at 101; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 66-76,
90-94.

19761

CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS

the absolute sense, so that the benefits to a calculating person committing the offense will not outweigh the costs of punishment. 178
Since it is the offense and not the offender that is crucial, the severity
of punishment for an offense depends only upon the harm society
believes to be caused by the type of crime and upon the consequent
deprivation to which society determines that the average person
79
committing the offense should be subjected.1
The incarceration of an offender is not necessarily the just disposition for all offenses; fines, probation, community service and even
pretrial intervention can be devised to constitute just deprivations of
liberty for offenses less serious than offenses demanding incarceration. 18 0 In a just deserts system, however, such alternatives to incarceration could never be permitted to replace incarceration for an
offense the just deprivation for which has been established as a given
term of incarceration. Pretrial intervention as interpreted by the
Leonardis court, as well as the Model Penal Code and existing sentencing practices in New Jersey, permit such alternative dispositions,
thereby destroying the proportionality of punishments and allowing
grievous offenses, under certain circumstances, to bear lenient
penalities.
One objection to a just deserts model of criminal dispositions is
that offenses must be ranked in order to establish proportionate
penalties. This problem is not a serious one, as studies suggest general agreement among persons from all segments of society upon
groupings of crimes according to their degrees of severity.181 For ex178 Beccaria, supra note 163, at 61-63; see A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 67.

These ideas invoke the concept of deterrence to help determine the appropriate magnitude of penalties. In meting out punishment to particular offenders, however, deterrence principles should not be utilized. See note 212 infra and accompanying text.
179The actual scale of just dispositions could be devised by a legislature, by the
supreme courts through actual guidelines or through case law, or by a special sentencing body. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 102-04. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 174-76 (1976) (judges may not legislate what is most appropriate punishment; they
may "require" only that "the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved").
180 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 118-23; see J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at 180.

See generally
Punishment: A
(1975). For an
tions on White

ABA, supra note 108, 13-20, 63-80, 107-08, 117-29; Note, Creative
Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57, 60-75
evaluation of a novel alternative sentence recently imposed, see ReflecCollar Sentencing, 86 YALE L.J. 589 (1977).

181 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 78-79; Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Serious-

ness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 Am. Soc. REV. 224
(1974). A study conducted in Baltimore in 1972 asked 200 adults to rank 140 specifically
described crimes into nine categories of "seriousness." Id. at 225-26. No definition of
"seriousness" was given to the respondents. Id. at 231. There was little difference
in
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ample, in the Model Penal Code, the New Jersey legislature has
managed to classify offenses into four degrees of "crime" and into
categories of "disorderly persons offenses." 1 2 It is probable, though,
that over a period of time the rank of certain offenses would be
changed, and the penalties they bear would change correspondingly.
As an illustration, society might consider an offense such as selective
service violation more serious in wartime.' s3 In addition, if the frequency of a certain offense such as robbery were to increase greatly,
society might consider itself more disadvantaged and might desire the
scale of penalties to have more deterrent value. Therefore, the degree of severity of the crime might be raised. 184
Another objection to punishment as the goal of criminal dispositions, and one more difficult to overcome, is that the theory merely
proposes proportionality, but does not establish how severe the penalties should be for different crimes on the scale. 185 The penalty that
each offense should bear is not self-evident. Kant, for example, states
categorically that if an offender "has committed a murder, he must
die."-186 In contrast, the Marquis de Beccaria, whose general
philosophy on punishment is similar to Kant's, argues that capital
punishment should never be imposed, because life imprisonment is
an adequate deterrent for even the most likely criminal. 18 7 The
eighth amendment, although it prohibits cruel and unusual punishresponse from members of subgroups having different backgrounds. Id. at 230-31, 233.
Furthermore, it was found that the respondents had little difficulty in performing the
ranking task. Id. at 226. Offenses against persons, such as specific types of murder and
rape, were ranked at the top of the seriousness scale, while crimes against property
involving no personal assault were ranked considerably lower. Id. at 227-29. Interestingly, white collar crimes, such as embezzlement and price fixing, were ranked fairly
low on the scale. Id. at 229. For the results of an informal study ranking five crimes in
comparison to antitrust violations, see Renfrew, supra note 170, at 601-05.
182 M.P.C. § 2C:1-4. For examples of the four degrees of crimes, see notes 51-55
supra and accompanying text. Examples of disorderly persons offenses include: "Criminal Mischief" involving damages of under $500, M.P.C. § 2C:17-3(b); "Criminal Trespass," unless perpetrated "in a dwelling," id. § 2C: 18-3(a); and issuing "Bad Checks,"
id. § 2C:21-5.
183 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 100.
184 Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 27.
1s5 See N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 75-76; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 93.
Morris states that "[tihe concept of desert is a necessary but not sufficient condition of
the punishment of crime." N. MORRIS, supra at 75. One of the problems arising out of a
just deserts system is that there is considerable variation among different ethnic and
national groups as to what the appropriate maximum levels of punishment should be.
Id. at 75-76.
186 [. KANT, supra note 167, at 102.
187 Beccaria, supra note 163, at 47. This view is based on his belief that a punishment which will not deter others is excessive. Id.
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ment, permits a legislature or other sentence-setting body considerable discretion in ascribing penalties along the scale of offenses.' 8 8
Thus, although a consensus as to the ranking of crimes might be
formed, it might be more difficult for society to reach a consensus as
to the maximum and minimum deprivations to be required at either
end of the scale.' 8 9
Furthermore, the just deserts model assumes that all persons
who commit a given crime derive the same advantage from it, and
that a given deprivation is felt in the same way by all offenders.190 It
might be argued, however, that a poor person is deprived of more
utility by a monetary fine than is a wealthy person. 19 1 Currently, it
seems that judges consider the utility theory in an inverted manner,
penalizing the poor more heavily than the wealthy.1 92 Although a just
deserts model would at least impose the same deprivations upon the
wealthy as upon the poor, it would not be possible to determine and
correct disparate utilities without reintroducing the type of discretion
that has been misused in the past.
Professor von Hirsch argues that the grievousness of an offense
in a just deserts system should depend upon the culpability of the
perpetrator as well as upon the harm risked or produced by the criminal act.193 By inflicting punishment, society is not only recouping an
advantage, but is also condemning an act; an individual who kills
188 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This discretion is limited, however, by community
mores and pressures. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan viewed "[r]ejection by society" as one of four principles to be
applied by a court in determining whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual. See id. at 277. He was careful to stress, however, the necessity of using objective
standards in determining whether "contemporary society considers a severe punishment
unacceptable." Id. at 278. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), the Court
stated that "an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment." The California supreme court recently indicated that a sentence could violate the "cruel and unusual" standard if its duration was excessive in relation to the offense involved. In re
Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 420-24, 503 P.2d 921, 927-30, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 223-26 (1972).
189See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 93-94. In determining appropriate maximum sentences, a legislature or other sentence-setting body might also wish to consider the deterrent effect of various possible alternatives. Thus, if two alternative sentences are under consideration for a crime which is probably not deterrable, the lesser
deprivation should be selected as a result of a rough application of the least drastic
means test. See id.; note 134 supra.
190 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 89-90.

191 See P. SAMUELSON,

ECONOMICS 407-27 (8th ed. 1970).
192See notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text. This practice constitutes "class

justice," by which "the middle-class person is put on probation and the ghetto youth
jailed for the same infraction." A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 90.
'9
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 69. As used here, culpability is similar to intent,
although the intent required to enhance culpability beyond the average exceeds the
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upon provocation or under the influence of passion may not be as
culpable as one who kills for hire. Therefore, the two killers should
not, arguably, be punished equally, even though the harm produced
is identical. Culpability looks solely to the individual offender's relationship to an offense at the tine it is committed; it has nothing to do
with his background, with his prognosis for rehabilitation, or with his
potential for recidivism. Nevertheless, any factors considered in
evaluating culpability are bound to be at least in part subjective and,
therefore, objectionable to some segments of society. For example,
von Hirsch argues that an offender's prior record is one factor to consider in determining culpability for a subsequent offense.'

94

He ar-

gues that having once been exposed to the criminal law, a subsequent
offender should be subjected to a more severe penalty because the
prior censure had insufficient impact and because the offender had
95
previously been made aware of the demands of the social contract.1
It is not self-evident, however, that a conviction for one crime (e.g.,
auto theft) makes one more aware of society's demands at the time of
a subsequent dissimilar crime (e.g., rape). In addition, it can be seen
than an offender who has received the just desert demanded by a
prior crime has already repaid society for the unfair advantage he
derived from that offense. 19 6 Including prior offenses in a calculation
of culpability sounds like an incapacitation-based system, rather than
one based on punishment. Therefore, if culpability is to affect dispositions, the factors to be considered must be scrutinized rigorously to
ensure that they are philosophically consistent with the precepts of
just deserts.
An historical objection to the use of punishment as the exclusive
determinant for individual criminal dispositions is that it has already
minimum mens rea needed for a criminal conviction. See notes 238-40 infra and accompanying text.
194 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 84-88. See also J. Q. WILSON, supra note 87, at
180.
195 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 85. Professor von Hirsch also argues that while
a sentencing court might have been unsure of an offender's culpability (i.e., knowledge
of society's demand) on the first occasion, it could not be unsure on a subsequent occasion. Id. at 85-86.
196 Furthermore, to augment a new sentence because of a prior conviction in effect
recoups more "advantage" for society than was lost by it. Since von Hirsch's model
excludes rehabilitation as a purpose of or justification for incarceration, see id. at 11-18,
he cannot logically argue that the failure of a disposition to rehabilitate justifies a more
severe sentence on a subsequent occasion. Von Hirsch's argument in behalf of the use
of prior convictions is strong, however, in the case of prosecution of an offender for
a subsequent, similar crime, particularly if an element of the crime requires specific
intent or special knowledge. See id. at 86.
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been tried and rejected.1 97 Another objection to such a system is that
it appears to permit the punishment of incarcerated offenders beyond
the simple deprivation of their liberty. Until the mid-twentieth century, retribution in this country was brutal, with corporal punishment
of all sorts regularly practiced for a wide variety of offenses, not just
the most heinous. 198 In addition, incarceration, particularly during
the nineteenth century, was for very long periods of time,19 9 perhaps
expressing proportionality as conceived at that time.

These objections are no longer valid, since modern punishment
practices do not include the severe methods formerly employed.
Many commentators now agree that sentences, no matter what the

rationale for their imposition, should be shorter than they presently
average.200 This modern concept of proportionality is reflected in the
Model Penal Code. 20 1 Today, except for the death penalty, corporal
punishment as the disposition of an offender has been virtually
abolished as cruel and inhuman. 20 2 Furthermore, the judiciary has
recently curtailed or eliminated most sanctions within prison walls
which are unrelated to the deprivation of liberty. 20 3 Inmates have
197

See J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME 27 (1943); Menninger,

Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 132-33 (J. Murphy ed.
1973).
198 See N. KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 14-16 ("flagellation, pillorying or mutilation"
were frequent forms of punishment).
199 See Bergan, supra note 13, at 2-3; cf. J. MITFORD, supra note 85, at 82-83 (punitive use of indeterminate sentences). Under a system of indeterminate sentences, the
offender receives the maximum term, which corrections officials have unfettered discretion to reduce or not, based on the prisoner's behavior. Id. Although on the surface,
"'the indeterminate sentence seems to imply a policy of early release for
the rehabilitated offender, it is actually a means of assuring much longer sentences . . . than would
normally be imposed by judges." Id. at 83.
200 See, e.g., ABA, supra note 108, at 1-2; CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 150-53;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 32. See also N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at
6-9; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 118.
201 See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text fur a discussion of'the sentencing
provisions of the Model Penal Code.
202 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 262-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussion of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment historically and in modern times). The first prisons were established by the Quakers as an alternative to the
various forms of corporal punishment that were used in the seventeenth century, See N.
KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 18; J. MITFORD, supra note 85, at 31.
203 See note 18 supra and note 291 infra for a listing and discussion of prisoners'rights cases and secondary material.
Application in this context of the least drastic means test, discussed at note 134
supra, requires that any punishments imposed upon prisoners be only those which are
absolutely necessary and which are the least drastic possible under the circumstances.
Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) ("censorship of prisoner[s'] mail"
must advance a "substantial governmental interest" and "be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved").
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been granted due process protections before institutional disciplinary
penalties may be imposed, in recognition of the fact that "[t]here is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
20 4
this country."
Since the basis of a punishment-oriented system is the deprivation of liberty, the confinement itself is what constitutes an offender's
punishment.2 0 5 Improved rehabilitative programs, with voluntary participation and complete divorce from any dispositional decision, can
be included in the just deserts model 20 6 to maximize the possibility
that released inmates will have been rehabilitated. If such reform
were to occur, it would defeat two additional historical objections to
the just deserts concept-that few, if any, rehabilitative opportunities
are offered offenders while they are serving sentences whose length
and form are based upon punishment,2 0 7 and that little concern is
20 8
given to the problems of former inmates.
Perhaps the most striking criticism of a true just deserts
framework of dispositions is that it eliminates the possibility of "having mercy" on an offender. 20 9 Although the criticism is valid as a
description of the system, its philosophical weakness lies in the
maxim that penal "disabilities are the consequences of the person's
own actions in having violated the law."2 1 Disproportionate leniency
in a given case based upon one judge's conception of mercy-a result
204 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
205 See Harris, supra note 14, at 293.
208 N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 14-15 ("treatment programs" should be expanded,

but treatment should not be the underlying reason for jailing offender); see A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 115-16 ("voluntary" training should be available (emphasis in
original)).
207 See N. KITTRIE, supra note 13, at 30.
208 See L. DEWOLF, supra note 94, at 64-65. For an in-depth discussion of this
problem, see D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at 135-70. The problems confronting parolees
range from lack of financial resources upon release, id.at 145, to statutory restrictions
on employment, id. at 151-52, to supervision by a parole officer who symbolizes the
"policing society" and who is unavailable at the hours when his assistance is most
needed, id. at 168-69.
Some progress has been made in New Jersey toward protecting the rights of exoffenders, particularly in the employment area. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:168A-1 to
-6 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); id. §§ 11:10-6.1, :17-1 (West 1976); note 43 supra.
209
See Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 26-27. Dershowitz views "flat-time sentencing
[as] too extreme a remedy" for the problem of disparity. Id. Thus, both von Hirsch and
Dershowitz recognize a need for "flexibility" within prescribed limits in order to dispose justly of certain types of cases. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 99, 125-26; Dershowitz, supra at 27.
210 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 148 (emphasis in original). Under a rehabilitative rationale, however, factors such as environmental and social conditions are stressed
in evaluating an offender's conduct. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
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permitted by the Model Penal Code but not by a just deserts modelwould depreciate the blameworthiness of an act and the seriousness
of the crime committed. Such a result is inappropriate, as it is not
the role of the criminal justice system to atone for social and
economic deprivations which may foster crininality.211
Systems of individualized criminal dispositions utilizing considerations of rehabilitation, incapacitation or deterrence produce no more
mercy than a pure just deserts system. 2 12 They produce instead unexplained disparity and the injustices of overincarceration in futile efforts to reduce recidivism. Only the offender who claims that he is of
below-average culpability for the type of crime of which he is accused
could be shown a degree of mercy in a just deserts system because
he deserves less condemnation for the crime than does the average
offender. In contrast, the offender who claims only hardship or re2 13
morse does not deserve a lesser-than-average denunciation.
Thus, it appears that a punishment-oriented system of dispositions does not attract criticism on empirical grounds because it is not
based upon an effort to predict recidivism or to produce rehabilitation.
Under a just deserts system, utilitarian concerns such as deterrence
and incapacitation are not considered in connection with individual
offenders, but rather are considered in defining types of offenses and
in establishing the scale of offenses and the range of dispositions. Finally, the just deserts model frees rehabilitiative programs of their
coercive concomitants by permitting offenders already sentenced to
choose for themselves whether or not to participate.
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS FOR NEW JERSEY

In proposing an improved system of criminal dispositions for
New Jersey, at least two main approaches could be taken. One would
be to reform only those elements which have resulted in unjustified
disparity, the system's most visible existing defect, but to retain flexibility in disposing of individual offenders. The second approach would
be more comprehensive, eliminating unjustified disparity in individual dispositions, while striving for a just system of dispositions.
211 See A. VON HIRSCH,

supra note 8, at 145-49.

212 See Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 122 (individualized systems utilizing indeter-

minate sentencing result in longer confinements of offenders since parole boards and
judges are not better able to resist political and social pressures than are legislatures).
Von Hirsch has suggested that any sentencing system, regardless of how much individual discretion it contains, will result in some unfairness. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note
8, at 101.
213 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 85-87, 125-27.
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The overriding concern over unjustified disparity has resulted in
recent endorsements of sentencing guidelines as a method of reforming the ills of the dispositional system. 2 14 The editors of the New
Jersey Law Journal have recommended adoption of the Model Penal
Code's sentencing provisions2 1 5 and the New York Times has
21 7
editorialized 2 16 in favor of Senator Kennedy's legislative proposal
which contains guidelines similar to those in the Code.2 18 Unfortunately, this faith in the efficacy of guidelines is misplaced. First, as
already shown, studies indicate that judges coming from different
backgrounds will interpret guidelines differently, even when given
identical offender case histories. 219 Second, it is virtually impossible
in any particular case to assign priorities to the conflicting justifications of dispositions included in the guidelines. Third, the effort to
achieve utilitarian goals such as deterrence through individual dispositions is doomed to frustration. 22 0 Therefore, the unstructured use of
guidelines, even with the requirement of written rationales for dispositions and with provision for appellate review of sentences, cannot
result in a significant reduction in disparity.
Only if the use of sentencing guidelines is strictlv structured so
that individual judges cannot react differently to identical offenders,
will a guidelines system succeed in reducing disparity. One way to
structure the use of guidelines is to adopt a sentencing matrix
-similar to that utilized for parole decisions by the United States
Parole Commission-in which the sentence to be imposed is based
upon the typical characteristics of a particular crime, as well as upon
214 See M. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 113-15.
215 99 N.J.L.J. 1108 (1976).

216 N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1977, at 34, col. 1.
217 S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S373 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977).
218 Section 3579 of S. 181 requires that in deciding upon whether to incarcerate an
offender, and in deciding how long to incarcerate him, a court shall evaluate
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense and promote respect for law by providing just punishment for the offense, (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and (C) to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant;
(3) whether other less restrictive sanctions have been applied to the defendant frequently or recently ....
Id. § 3579. Note that Senator Kennedy would implicitly exclude rehabilitative potential
from judicial consideration.
See note 10 supra for a discussion of S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 2003, 123
CONG. REC. S6835 (daily ed. May 2, 1977) which also would require use of guidelines.
219 See notes 99-104 supra and accompanying text.
220 See notes 166-71 supra and accompanying text.
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those of a typical person committing that crime. 22 1 Use of this type of
222
system has in fact been effective in reducing disparity.
Such a system contains certain basic flaws, however. First of all,
it tends to err on the side of overincarceration. 2 23 And more fundamentally, it incorporates factors which are philosophically inconsistent
with the just disposition of individual offenders. Since such a descriptive model makes no effort to be internally consistent philosophically,
and since it obfuscates the issue of justice inescapably intertwined
with each criterion and dispositional justification selected in developing a system, 224 it should be rejected in choosing reforms for New
Jersey.
The second alternative is more prescriptive than descriptive,
and, as noted earlier, strives to eliminate unjustified disparity, while
achieving a system that is just overall. A just deserts system meets
these criteria and is most fair to the individual offender. At the same
time, the just deserts system can accommodate society's utilitarian
interests in protecting itself by reforming offenders, preventing recidivism and deterring other crine. 225 Use of this second approach
avoids the philosophical and empirical problems inherent in applying
justifications other than punishment to individual dispositions, and
should form the basis of any reform of New Jersey's system of criminal dispositions.
Any attempt to add flexibility to a just deserts system through

consideration of an offender's characteristics would reintroduce the
disparity and consequent unjustified deprivations of liberty criticized
above. For example, Professor Dershowitz, in an effort to built flexibility and the possibility of mercy into a just deserts system, recently
recommended adoption of " 'presumptive sentencing.' "226 Under the
Dershowitz scheme, sentencing judges would be permitted to sentence above or below the legislatively established presumptive sentence, detailing their reasons in writing, if any of certain legislatively
established aggravating or mitigating factors were present. The factors
suggested allow consideration of the individual offender since they
include such characteristics as sex, age, marital status, employment
221

Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 27.

222 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 14.
223 Cf. note 128 supra and accompanying text (protecting the public may be advanced as justification for overincarceration).
224 See R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 25 (1977) (social "practice" must be
structured justly, not merely administered in a just fashion).

225 See note 14 supra.
226 See Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 27.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 1

and education. 2 27 On appeal, there would be a presumption against
any variation from the "presumptive sentence. 228
By incorporating offender characteristics similar to those proposed by Dershowitz or the Model Penal Code, the basic just deserts
system is undermined philosophically. Personal characteristics are irrelevant to penalties in a just deserts system, and are relevant only to
those dispositional justifications inimical to just deserts. Moreover,
Professor Dershowitz's particular system lacks any structure to govern
the use of offender characteristics, such as the matrix developed by
the Parole Commission in connection with its purely descriptive
model. Judges attempting to apply aggravating and mitigating factors
will inevitably utilize them subjectively and disparately. Although appellate review of the reasons for avoiding the presumptive sentence is
2 29
contemplated, this system ignores the poor record of such review.
Thus, although Dershowitz has introduced flexibility and the possibility of mercy, he has invited judges to balance conflicting factors on an
ad hoc basis and has reintroduced justifications improper for individual dipositions. As the criteria available to judges become more
permissive, the less a sentencing system resembles a pure just de230
serts model.
DEVISING A JUST DESERTS SYSTEM

In order to eliminate that degree of judicial discretion which
would continue to foster unjustified disparity in New Jersey, and also
to produce a philosophically consistent and just system of dispositions, the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code should be
amended. The wide range of sentencing options available for identical
offenses-extended terms of incarceration, basic terms of incarceration, probation, suspended sentences or fines-should be severely
227
228

Id.
Id.

229 The author endorses appellate review in order to maintain a check on the appli-

cation of factors relating to culpability and upon the use of the matrix suggested at pp.
52-55 infra.
230 Professor Dershowitz recently wrote a background paper for the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing. See generally Dershowitz, supra note 9.
The Task Force's Report advocates a just deserts model with judges retaining discretion
to modify the "presumptive sentence" for each crime by recourse to certain enumerated
aggravating and mitigating factors. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8; at 20-23.
Unlike the factors referred to by Dershowitz in his New York Times Magazine article,
the Task Force's factors do not relate to the offender's background, but rather to his
involvement with the crime committed. Compare id. at 43-45 with Dershowitz, supra
note 11, at 27. Nevertheless, the problems of lack of structure and the difficulty of establishing priorities among the factors of each crime remains.
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limited. In addition, it would be necessary to delete most of the
factors set forth by the Model Penal Code for judicial consideration
prior to sentencing: risk of commission of another crime, need for
correctional treatment, likelihood that the victim will be compensated, prior record of the defendant, character and attitudes of the
defendant, predicted affirmative response to probation, and likelihood that imprisonment would entail excessive hardship. 2 3 1 Many
of these factors cannot be assessed to any degree of certainty. Moreover, by focusing on issues which reflect the offender's overall background and personality, rather than on those characteristics which
relate to the commission of the offense in question, the goal of rehabilitation is mingled with those of incapacitation and deterrence.
Consideration of such goals by judges in individual cases would inexorably result in a continuation of the sentencing disparity which New
Jersey should be avoiding. As the failure of the existing system demonstrates, the use of such subjective factors fails to further society's
utilitarian interests.
What is needed is action by the legislature or by a sentencing
commission to establish a fixed scale of dispositions encompassing
each offense or class of offenses. That scale should be founded upon
the disadvantage which society deems itself to have incurred when a
particular average offense is committed. A starting point in developing the scale could be the average disposition currently meted out for
an offense; since current dispositions are based in part upon factors
suggested to be impermissible, refinements would be in order.
Once a just deserts scale is established, the disposition for an
individual offender should be varied slightly from the dictates of the
scale, only if the offender were found to be above or below "average"
culpability for that offense. 23 2 The "average" culpability for a given
type of offense could be established by canvassing already sentenced
offenders and determining the characteristics of a typical offense of
that category. The Model Penal Code supports this approach by
defining certain offenses on the basis of culpability. 233 For example,
231 M.P.C. §§ 2C:44-1(a)(l)-42), (b)(6)-(7), (9)-411); see notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
232 See notes 193-96 supra and accompanying text.
Lists of suggested aggravating and mitigating factors are included in the National
Advisory Commission's study, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 150-51, and in the
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 44-45. Some of the corrections factors,
however, are related to the offender's background, and not to his culpability. See
CORRECTIONS, supra at 150-51.
233 See M.P.c. 2 2C:2-2(e) which considers "[c]ulpability as determinant of [the]
grade of [an] offense."
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criminal homicide can be murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide, depending upon the offender's degree of culpability.2 3 4 Kidnapping can be a crime of the first or second degree, depending upon
the safe release of the victim, or of the fourth degree if interference
23 5
with the custody of a child or of committed persons is involved.
Degree of culpability could also be relevant within any single
crime defined by the legislature. For example, the average crime of
statutory rape might be deemed one committed by a person who
made no effort to ascertain the victim's age and whose victim neither
protested nor consented to the crime.2 3 6 As another example, the
average auto theft might be viewed as one committed by an offender
who takes one vehicle on the spur of the moment and abandons it the
2 37
following day.
Under a just deserts system, a judge should be permitted discretion to compare the circumstances of the individual offender's crime
to those of the average crime of that type 238 as determined through
the canvass of previously convicted offenders. Certain of the provisions of the Model Penal Code could serve as an appropriate measure
of an offender's culpability. For example, some of the factors contained in section 2C:44-1(b) of the Model Penal Code (factors justifying a sentence of no imprisonment) should be retained, as they do
suggest a lesser culpability in the commission of the particular offense
charged. These factors are (1) the failure of the conduct to cause or
threaten harm, or the failure of the offender to contemplate that it
would; (2) the existence of provocation; (3) the presence of substantial
grounds for excuse or justification falling short of an affirmative defense; and (4) the contribution to the crime of the victim's own
conduct.239 Likewise, some of the conditions listed in section 2C:44-3
(factors allowing imposition of an extended sentence) should also remain in the Code because they reflect a greater-than-average degree
of culpability. These factors are (1) the offender managed the offense
234 Id. §§ 2C:11-2 to -5; see id. § 2C:2-2.
235 Id. §§ 2C:13-1(c), -4.
236 New Jersey's Model Penal Code defines rape as a function of several factors: the

degree of force or compulsion, the victim's age, the degree of the victim's awareness as
recognized by the offender, and whether the victim knew the offender was not the
victim's spouse. Id. § 2C:14-1. Rape can be a crime of either the first, second or third
degree depending on how the facts reflect the above considerations. Id.
237 The grading of theft offenses is contained in id. § 2C:20-2(b). This delineation is
similar to traditional definitions of offenses in that it does not detail what would constitute a typical offense. Compare id. with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:119-1 to -5, -5.2, -9
(West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
238 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 80-81.
239 M.P.C. § 2C:44-1(b)(1)-(5).
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as part of ongoing criminal activity, and (2) the offender was paid for
240
the commission of the crime.
To illustrate how these culpability factors might be applied in
specific cases, it will be helpful to view their effect in a statutory rape
and in a theft case which vary from the "average" crimes described
above. Thus, the statutory rape in which an individual has intercourse with a girl he met while she was hitchhiking at night, who
told him that she was sixteen and invited the sexual activity, should
be considered to involve less culpability on the part of the perpetrator than does the average statutory rape. 24 ' A lesser sentence
would be justified since our hypothetical offender has substantial
grounds for excuse which fail, however, to establish a defense, and
since the victim's conduct also contributed to the crime. As another
example, the individual who directs others in a large auto-theft operation should be considered more culpable than the person committing
the average auto theft because the crime was a part of an ongoing
criminal enterprise for profit.
Use of culpability factors permits some flexibility in meting out
dispositions without detracting from the soundness of the just deserts
model. Whether as a result of statutory definition of the crime or as a
result of differentiation among similar crimes based upon culpability
factors considered by a judge, all disparity in sentences would result
from differences in the seriousness of the offenses committed. No
disparity would be caused by differences in the offenders' backgrounds or in their prognoses for rehabilitation or recidivism nor by
the effort to deter other criminals. In addition, even those offenders
of above-average or below-average culpability would receive a disposition only slightly at variance with the just desert for the average
offense of that type. Judges would have extremely limited discretion
and would not be permitted to choose among alternative dispositions.
Illustrated below are two alternative sentencing structures which
could be utilized in a just deserts system. Both of the Tables selectively incorporate provisions of New Jersey's Model Penal Code.
Under either of the proposed Tables judges would be limited to the
sentences indicated. Table I takes into consideration only the degree
of the crime as defined in the Model Penal Code and the degree of
culpability of the offender. Thus, any second-degree crime, whether
kidnapping or manslaughter, is penalized by the same sentence: eight
years of incarceration for a high degree of culpability, six and one-half
years for an average degree of culpability and five years for a low
degree of culpability. Table II also takes into consideration the de240
241

Id. § 2C:44-3(b)-(c).
The author obtained a conviction from a jury in just such a case.
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Sentencing Tables
TABLE I
Degree of Crime

Degree of Culpability*

as Defined in M.P.C.

High

First Degree

Average

18

14.5

Second Degree

8

6.5

Third Degree

4

2

Fourth Degree

12 mos.

Disorderly Persons

6 mos.

Low
11
5
6 mos.

6 mos.

18 mos. Prob.

6 mos. Prob.
& Fine

PTI

TABLE II
Degree of Crime as Defined
in At.P.C.

M.P.C.
Citation

Degree of Culpability*

FIRST DEGREE CRIMES

High

2 42

Murder
Kidnapping
Aggravated Rape

2C:11-3
2C: 13- l(c)
2C: 14-1(a)

26
18
18

Average

Low

23
14.5
14.5

20
11
11

6
6
6

5
5
5

SECOND DEGREE CRIMES
Manslaughter
Kidnapping
Extortion

2C: 11-4
2C: 13-1
2C:20-2b(1)

8
7.5
7

2C: 14-3
2C:20-2b(2)(a)

4
3

THIRD DEGREE CRIMES
Statutory Rape
Fraud Over $500

3
5 yrs. Prob.

5 yrs. Prob.
3yrs. Prob.

& Fine

& Fine

FOURTH DEGREE CRIMES
Interference
with Custody
Possession of
Switchblades

2C: 13-4

12 mos.

6 mos.

18 mos. Prob.

2C:39-3

18 mos.

6 mos.

18 mos. Prob.

2C:20-2b(3)

6 mos.

PTI

2C:34-2

6 mos.

6mos. Prob.
& Fine
Fine

DISORDERLY PERSONS OFFENSES
Possession of
Stolen Property Less
than $200
Prostitution

PTI

* All sentences are for years of incarceration unless otherwise indicated.

242 The higher sentences

for murder reflect the Code's treatment of murder as a

crime demanding a special penalty. See id. § 2C: 11-3(b).
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gree of culpability (high, average or low), but provides three possible
sentences for each specific crime as opposed to each degree of crime.
Thus, crimes of similar severity are penalized similarly but not identically. As a result, under Table II, the second-degree crimes of kidnapping and extortion require slightly different punishments.
Both Tables are consistent with the just deserts model, and both
reveal this model's limitation upon the exercise of judicial discretion.
As the Tables indicate, incarceration would not be required for all
offenses; probation, fines and pretrial intervention would be available,
but not as alternatives to one another or to incarceration. On a practical level the scale and the dispositions included therein would have
to take account of the serious problem of prison overcrowding in New
Jersey. 243 The particular sentences included in the Tables are only
the author's suggestions to the legislature or other disposition-setting
body, which might decide to make modifications after gaining some
243 Since judges would no longer be able to take account of crowding in penal institutions in deciding individual dispositions, the sentence-setting body should examine
institutional capacity together with historic numbers of persons committing various offenses and the sentences established. If those factors taken together indicate that overcrowding will result, then either more institutions would have to be built or the
sentence-setting body would have to reduce systematically the incarceration established
for some overall offenses. To permit overcrowding would be to permit history to repeat
itself, see notes 197-208 supra and accompanying text, and might violate the eighth
amendiment.
The proposed system may itself unwittingly ameliorate, or at least not aggravate,
the overcrowding problem. Since only those offenders determined by the matrix to warrant incarceration would be imprisoned, the result may be that a different class of offenders will be incarcerated than under the current system of judicial discretion. For
example, currently in New Jersey the average offender sentenced to a period of incarceration has been convicted of a more serious offense than the average offender of previous times. MASTER PLAN DATA, supra note 41, at 10-11 (Supp. I). These average inmates, however, in spite of the increased severity of their offenses are remaining in
prison for shorter periods than heretofore. CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note
76, at 71. See also Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 26 (discussing relationship between
many defendants receiving long sentences and many receiving none).
The importance of these considerations relates to the fact that the conditions of
incarceration determine to a certain extent the true deprivation resulting therefrom. See
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 115. One year in a muaximum-security institution is a
harsher penalty than one year on a work farm. See Millemann, Prison Disciplinary
Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The Requirements of a Full Administrative
Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27, 38-39 (1971). Therefore, similar offenders should be sentenced initially to similar types of confinements. Such a system has been proposed to
the author by Christopher Dietz, Chairman of the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Under his proposal, all inmates might initially be classified to a maximum security institution, and after having served a fixed percentage of their term, might progress to a
medium security institution, and so on until release. Only if an inmate posed a special
threat to other inmates, or violated institutional rules, would he remain in or be returned to an institution of higher security. See also N. MORRIS, sunpra note 18, at 100-07
(graduated release plan).
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experience with a given scale and a given set of dispositions. After
the legislature or other body established the specific punishments for
each offense, a judge would be permitted to determine, based on the
record, only whether the individual offender before him was of
above-average, average or below-average culpability.
Probationary terms should be included in the tables for offenses
not warranting incarceration. The form of probation would have to be
altered, however. Presently, probation is nonpunitive, requiring reports to a probation officer as prescribed by the sentencing judge, as
well as conformity to various conditions. 2 44 Although some of these
conditions, such as restrictions upon associations and travel, do restrict liberty, a just deserts system would require more clearly defined deprivations of liberty because such deprivations constitute the
essence of punishment. 24 5 Furthermore, in order for the utilitarian
interests built into the criminal justice system to have any impact,
the deprivation included in probation must be made clear to offenders and nonoffenders alike. Requiring a person on probation to
spend an amount of time engaged in public or community work without compensation, for example, deprives that person of liberty without incarceration and would fit the just deserts model being
proposed. 246 A scale of deprivations could and should be devised for
persons placed on probation; the more serious the offense warranting
2 47
probation, the greater the deprivation should be.
Similarly, pretrial intervention programs could be effectively
utilized within the just deserts system. For minor offenses such as
prostitution, society's ends might be served without conviction and
sentence through an offender's participation in a program of therapy
or training. Likewise, offenders convicted of possession of marijuana
or of certain narcotic drugs might be required to spend several after244 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 168-2 (West 1971); see Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, in PROBATION AND PAROLE 407, 414-16 (1970); Rheiner, The Period
of Probation, in PROBATION AND PAROLE 170, 171-72 (1970). Conditions of probation

may include, for example, required employment, restrictions on moving, avoidance of
certain persons, and continued residence in the state. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168-2 (West
1971).
245 See Harris, supra note 14, at 293.
246 See Note, supra note 180, at 64-65. The author of the Note advocates alterations
in the use of probation whereby the offender would make restitution to his victim. Id. at
69. In the case of a victimless crime, he suggests that the offender be assigned to work
in a community project. Id. at 65. He refers to such proposals as "creative sentencing"
and concludes that such sentencing "adjusts the punishment for each individual case to
effect the greatest possible return to society." Id.
247 The same type of proportional scale would be used for fines or for any other
type of disposition.
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noons a week in a drug treatment center.2 4 8 Whether or not the
therapy, treatment or training actually reformed or rehabilitated the
offender, the deprivation of liberty inherent in forced participation
would serve to recoup the advantage obtained by the offender. Because release or termination would not be dependent upon "cure,"
the rehabilitative efforts would, as a byproduct, have a greater chance
249
of success.
MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS

Offenders who are to be sentenced at one time upon multiple
convictions present the just deserts sentencing system with thorny
issues. Presently, such offenders generally receive concurrent sentences. The Model Penal Code would leave the decision on inposition of concurrent or consecutive sentences to the judge's complete
discretion. 250 Several commentators, however, have urged a presumption in favor of concurrent terms within sentencing reforms that
otherwise retain general judicial discretion. 2 51 However, neither unfettered judicial discretion nor use of a presumption in favor of concurrent terms would be appropriate in a just deserts system.
There are three common types of situations in which this multiple offense problem arises. 25 2 First, multiple charges may stem from
one incident, as when one possesses and then sells a narcotic drug.
At the other extreme, multiple charges may arise from distinct, dissimilar offenses, such as one indictment charging possession of a
switchblade, and another charging extortion (without any weapon in-

volved). Third, a single criminal activity may involve multiple and distinct but similar criminal acts, as when one sells narcotic drugs on a
number of occasions, perpetrates a series of fraudulent land sales, or
extorts money from a number of victims.
As a solution to the first formulation of the problem, an extension of the emerging doctrine of merger 253 may be appropriate.
248 Possession of less than 26 grams of marijuana is currently a disorderly persons

offense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-20(a)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
249 See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
250 M.P.C. § 2C:44-5(a). The Code does not suggest any guidelines to assist judges

in making the decision.
251 See, e.g., ABA, supra note 108, § 3.4(b) & Commentary, at 171-72, 176-79;
CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, Standard 5.6.
252 See CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, Standard 5.6, at 165-66 (hypothesizing five
different examples of multiple offense situations).
252 For a discussion of the merger doctrine in New Jersey, see State v. Best, 70 N.J.
56, 58-71, 356 A.2d 385, 386-93 (1976); State v. Valentine, 69 N.J. 205, 206-15, 351 A.2d
751, 752-56 (1976); State v. Sempsey, 141 N.J. Super. 317, 324-25, 358 A.2d 212, 216-17
(App. Div. 1976); State v. Pratts, 145 N.J. Super. 79, 94, 366 A.2d 1327, 1336-37 (App.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1976).
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When one "participates in a single, continuous criminal episode and
then is prosecuted for several crimes each of which represents a different stage of the episode," 254 the crimes should be merged for the
purpose of sentence into the one that is the most serious. 25 5 The
advantage the offender obtains over society would generally accrue
from the ultimate crime the offender intended to, and did, commit.
Thus, the disposition of the offender who possessed and then sold
narcotics should be dictated by the just desert for the sale-the more
256
inclusive and more serious offense.
In the case of the individual facing criminal disposition for several distinct, dissimilar offenses, a just deserts system would demand
consecutive sentences. The offender has taken advantage of society several times and in several ways. Those distinct advantages would not
be recouped through concurrent dispositions.
The most difficult problem is presented by the example involving
the repetition of a similar crime on a number of occasions. On the
one hand, as statutes are currently defined, each act is a separate
offense, deserving separate and consecutive punishment in a just deserts framework. Such a result, however, merely shifts sentencing
discretion to the prosecutor, who could decide how many such repetitive acts to charge and, therefore, how many consecutive dispositions would be imposed. 2 57 The prisons might become populated by
offenders committing relatively minor offenses with great frequency,
rather than by the smaller number of offenders who commit sporadic
acts of violence. 258 On the other hand, such offenders could be viewed
as having been engaged in one criminal enterprise. The "promoting
gambling" provision of the Model Penal Code takes this view in part,
by defining as one offense the receipt or acceptance of three or more
bets in any two-week period. 259 It might, however, be difficult to
254 State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 61, 356 A.2d 385, 388 (1976).

255 Id. at 61-68, 356 A.2d at 388-91.
256 The author is suggesting an extension of the merger doctrine since State v. Valentine, 69 N.J. 205, 209-12, 351 A.2d 751, 752-54 (1976), and Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 387-91 (1958), have held that such crimes do not merge. Similarly, the crime
of conspiracy should be merged for purposes of sentencing into one of the objects of the
conspiracy if the object formed the basis of a charge and conviction. See Developments
in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 968-71 (1959).
257 For a discussion of plea bargaining, see notes 262-75 infra and accompanying
text.
256 The MASTER PLAN DATA, supra note 41, suggest that minor crimes are vastly
more prevalent than the five most violent crimes.
259 See M.P.C. § 2C:37-2(b); cf. In re Fontana, 100 N.J.L.J. 267 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. Mar. 31, 1977) (five separate breaking and entries and five separate larcenies in
one night spree considered one crime for expungement statute).
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secure agreement as to which series of multiple offenses should be
viewed and treated as one enterprise, and which should not.2 60
It is preferable to treat such repeated, similar offenses as one
criminal enterprise. This approach is more pragmatic than handling
them individually, and could be incorporated into a just deserts system by redefining certain offenses to include individual acts within a
more broadly defined, continuing criminal enterprise. Or, for certain
offenses, the average offense could be defined as having been coinmitted on a number of occasions, with fewer or more acts being a
mitigating or an aggravating factor as to culpability.
Criminal dispositions are made not only by judges. Prosecutors
through plea bargains, and parole boards through release decisions,
currently also participate in determining both the length and the type
of disposition an offender receives. 26 1 A just deserts system, or any
other system of dispositions, which attempts to eliminate or restrict
judicial discretion, would be undermined totally if the discretion inhering in prosecutors and parole boards were not reformed in tandem
with the sentencing system.
PLEA BARGAINING

Plea bargaining, as currently practiced by prosecutors and de2 62
fense attorneys in New Jersey and elsewhere, has various forms.
When there are several outstanding indictments against an individual,
the prosecution may ask the appropriate judge to dismiss certain of
the charges if the offender pleads guilty to at least one of them. 26 3 Or
a charge against an offender may be downgraded from a high mis260 Although many people might agree on such treatment for offenders committing
gambling or narcotics offenses, they might not for the offender who, for example, perpetrates seven breaking and entries of homes within a three-week period.
261 See ABA, su pra note 108, at 242-43. The Model Penal Code fails in any way to
address the issues raised by plea bargaining.
262 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS
42-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS]. See generally Alsehuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968).
263 See Alschuler, supra note 262, at 85-89. Alschuler describes this type of plea bargaining as being based on "horizontal overcharging," which occurs in two forms: (1) splitting one criminal incident "into numerous component offenses," or (2) charging as "a
separate offense" every crime of which the defendant is accused. Id. at 85, 87. The chief
purpose of such overcharging is to facilitate obtaining a plea of guilty in return for the
prosecutor's dropping some of the charges. Id. at 85-86. Such a system fails to achieve
just deserts in two ways. If the overcharging is spurious and done simply for the purpose
of inducing a guilty plea, the defendant might actually plead guilty to some offenses
which he did not commit to avoid trial on even more serious charges which are included. On the other hand, if the defendant is actually guilty of all charges included,
the sentence he receives will be less than what he justly deserves.
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demeanor to a misdemeanor, or to a disorderly persons offense. 26 4
Lastly, the most important form from a defendant's point of view is
that the prosecutor may agree to recommend a specific sentence or
26 5
an upper limit on a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty.
Under a just deserts system of dispositions, plea bargaining
would have to be eliminated insofar as it is not "based on penologically relevant considerations";266 otherwise the disposition would reflect the bargain and its underlying impermissible justifications rather
than the just desert for an offense. 267 Sentence bargaining is a significant cause of the sentencing disparity 2 68 which a just deserts
model attempts to eliminate. The bargained sentence may be as
much a result of the attitudes and abilities of counsel as of the facts
underlying a prosecution. 269 Furthermore, judges often impose sentence on the basis of the "real crime" revealed by the presentence
report, regardless of the downgrading or dismissal of charges result264

See id. at 86. This type of bargain is based on what Alsehuler denominates

'vertical overcharging.' " Id. In such a case "the prosecutor actually seeks conviction"
for "a 'lesser included offense.' " Id.
265 COURTS, supra note 262, at 43; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 11. See
also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1971) (agreement by prosecutor not
to recommend a particular sentence).
266 Alschuler, supra note 262, at 57. Some proponents of plea bargaining rationalize
the justice of the process by pointing out that inasmuch as "a guilty plea evidences a
defendant's repentance," that defendant deserves a lesser sentence. Id. Such a rationale
is clearly incompatible with the just deserts system proposed by this article. See also
COURTS, supra note 262, at 46-49.
267 See Alsehuler, supra note 262, at 52-85. See also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 8,
at 104-06. The Alschuler article discusses various reasons advanced by prosecutors for
attempting to bargain cases rather than trying them. Among these rationales are (1) administrative efficiency-the desire to reduce the much-touted "backlog" in the courts,
Alschuler, supra at 52-56, (2) advocacy-the desire to achieve as many convictions and
the most severe ones possible, id. at 52, (3) desire to achieve what he perceives to be
"the 'right thing' for the defendant," id., at 53, (4) desire to mitigate the consequences
of a law which is " 'too harsh,' " id., and (5) weakness of the prosecution's case, id. at
58--60. Only the last of these reasons may be consistent with a just deserts system. See
note 275 infra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, insofar as a weak case may reflect
the fact that a defendant is actually innocent, any pressuring of such a defendant to enter
a guilty plea is an attempt to accomplish injustice. See Alschuler, supra at 60.
268 See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90
HARV. L. REv. 564, 580-82 (1977), But see id. at 576, 580 (prosecutorial concessions
resulting from guilty pleas may narrow sentence range and judges' discretion). Some of
the disparities created by a plea-bargaining system are inequities in sentences between
defendants who plead guilty and those who are convicted of the same crimes, and "inequalities among those who plead guilty." Id. at 580. In addition, when viewed in terms
of the actual offense committed, as opposed to the offense for which sentence is imposed, variations in treatment among comparable" offenders will be substantial.
269 Id. at 581-82; see Alschuler, supra note 262, at 79-81. Alschuler observes that
"[viagaries of judicial personality" may also encourage a decision to plea bargain. Id. at
80-81.
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ing from the plea bargain. 270 Therefore, eliminating the possibility of
downgrading or dismissal may increase the integrity of the process.
Although the practice of plea bargaining developed largely as a
means of disposing of the volume of cases straining prosecutors' offices and court dockets, it is not clear whether or not many more
defendants would in fact demand trials if plea bargaining were eliminated. Presently, approximately ten percent of defendants exercise
their right to trial. 2 71 Informal results from New Jersey counties 2 72
and experiences elsewhere indicate that when plea bargaining has
been curtailed, the increase in the number of defendants exercising
their right to trial has been relatively small. 27 3 In the federal system,
at least in the district of New Jersey, there has not been any sentence
bargaining, yet there has not been an inordinately high number of
defendants demanding trial. 2 74 One reason for this result, relevant to
270 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at 88-90.

271 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 n.1 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (in 1964, 95.5% of New York convictions, 90.2% of federal convictions and 74%
of California convictions obtained by guilty pleas) (citing COURTS, supra note 262, at 9);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 & n.10 (1970) (90-95% "of all criminal convictions," 70-85% "of all felony convictions . . . by guilty plea"); COURTS, supra at 42
("[i]n many courts, more than 90 percent of criminal convictions" based on guilty
pleas); Alschuler, supra note 262, at 50; Note, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the
Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 527 (1971) (rate of guilty
pleas ranges from 60-95%). See generally Alschuler, supra at 54-55.
272 Middlesex County and Ocean County Prosecutors C. Judson Hamlin and Edward Tumbach have respectively reported to the author that the virtual elimination of
sentence bargaining has not resulted in a higher percentage of defendants demanding
trials or in an increased criminal backlog. In those counties, more important than
whether sentence bargaining is permitted is whether petty offenses are disposed of in
municipal court without indictment, and whether indictments returned are legally and
factually sound. It is possible, however, that defendants plead guilty in these areas because they are aware of the sentencing predelictions of the judges hearing criminal
matters.

273 Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621, 624 (1976) (almost
total elimination of plea bargaining in Maricopa County, Arizona, resulting in no increase in number of trials). See also COURTS, supra note 262, at 46-47 (augmented caseload and expense do not necessarily result when plea bargaining curtailed, as indicated
by Philadelphia, Pennsylvania experience); Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining
in Black Hawk County: A Case Study, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1066-70 (1975) (decrease
in plea bargaining in conjunction with addition of several supportive factors resulting
in increased efficiency in small city system).
274 A comparison between the number of guilty and nolo contendere pleas and the
number of defendants actually tried in the District of New Jersey serves to illustrate
this point. In fiscal year 1976, there were 766 pleas and only 152 trials of federal defendants in New Jersey. [1976] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 11-22. For 1975, the figures were
578 pleas and 126 trials. [19751 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS A-58. In 1974, 539 pleaded guilty
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a just deserts system, is that a defendant may wish to avoid revealing
the details of a crime through testimony at trial, thereby appearing
particularly culpable and receiving an enhanced sentence. Under a
just deserts model, it is even possible that an increased number of
defendants charged with the less serious offenses would plead guilty,
since much of the uncertainty as to type and length of sentence will
have been eliminated.
It is consistent to retain two forms of plea bargaining in a just
deserts system, however. First, a prosecutor frequently finds himself
unable to prove the indicted offense, but able to prove a lesser
offense. 2 75 In such a case, downgrading the indicted charge to one
that is provable is less plea bargaining than it is correcting a defect
in the indictment process. Permitting this type of bargain would
eliminate the unfairness and futility inherent in holding a trial which
would result in an acquittal of the more serious charge. Second, multiple charges arising out of one incident usually reflect only one harm
to the victim and to society. 276 A dismissal of all charges save the
most serious one proveable would not do violence to just deserts sentencing because the disposition would be proportional to the actual
27 7
harm caused.
Thus, the just deserts system has its main impact in this area by
eliminating the opportunity to plea bargain when the prosecutor has a
solid case. The elimination of this type of plea bargaining promotes
greater justice and furthers society's interests, since plea bargaining
such a case advances no underlying dispositional interest such as rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence or punishment, but promotes
only the interest of expediency.
or nolo contendere, and 89 were tried. [1974] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
Although there
is no formal report or memorandum confirming the lack of sentence bargaining, this
fact has been confirmed to Seton Hall Law Review by Judge H. Curtis Meanor, United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey (July 1, 1977) (letter on file at Seton
Hall Law Review).
275 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 10; Alschuler, supra note 262, at
58-60. Such a situation may result from the disappearance of a witness in the years
intervening between commission of the offense and trial, id. at 65; or, the prosecutor
may have been careless and presented to the grand jury for consideration statutory authority which does not fit the circumstances of the offense committed.
276 In New Jersey, the emerging doctrine of merger may be viewed as a response to
the fact that even though there may be several charges stemming from one incident,
they do not necessarily reflect separate harms. For a discussion of merger, see notes
253-56 supra and accompanying text.
277 Such a plea bargain is analogous to the situation where a judge imposes one
sentence for multiple crimes arising out of a single criminal episode. See notes 254-56
supra and accompanying text.
OF THE ADMINSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS A-58.
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PAROLE RELEASE DECISIONMAKING

Parole is an extension of the sentencing process for incarcerated
offenders. 2 78 Each year nationwide over 60,000 offenders are paroled,
subject to certain supervisory conditions, prior to the expiration of
their terms of incarceration. 27 9 At any point in time there are several
thousand people on parole in New Jersey; for example, there were
8,000 people on state parole in 1974.280 Both the decisionmaking
process leading to release and the supervision of parolees have recently come under serious criticism as being arbitrary and
ineffective. 2 8 1 Under the present parole system in New Jersey,
neither sentencing judges, offenders, victims nor the public have any
idea how much of an imposed sentence of incarceration an offender
will actually serve.2 82 The New Jersey State Parole Board, utilizing
unarticulated criteria, makes its virtually invisible decisions concern23
ing parole release at a date much later than the date of sentencing.
Even those systems whose parole release criteria are explicit fail
to accomplish a just result. First of all, in pursuing and reconciling
the goals of rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence and punishment, parole boards generally have utilized the same subjective fac278 One article has suggested that under current practices, "parole selection is, in
reality, more of a deferred sentencing decision-a decision on when to release-than a
parole/no parole decision." Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Paroling
Policy Explicit, 21 CRIME & DELIN. 34, 36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gottfredson]
(emphasis in original); see Harris, supra note 14, at 294-95.
279 D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at 1. The justification for parole supervision is based
upon three theories: (1) "grace" on the part of a government which could have kept a
prisoner incarcerated, (2) "consent" on the part of the inmate to live in accordance with
the parole conditions imposed, and (3) "custody" retained by the government over a
parolee for the protection of society. Id.
280 PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 69.
281 See, e.g., Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 246-50, 277 A.2d
193, 197-99 (1971); D. STANLEY, snpra note 79, at 6, 47; Harris, supra note 14, at
296-97; Project, supra note 121, at 816.
282 PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 75, at 29-30, 40-42. A study of the New Jersey
Parole Board found that Board determinations of parole release dates were occasionally
based on either incorrect or outdated information, creating needless postponements and
lack of certainty for the prisoner. Id. at 30. Even after a decision granting parole is
made, a prisoner will spend an uncertain amount of time in prison before release. In the
group studied this period "ranged . . . from one week to three and one-half years." Id.
at 41.
283 See id. at 33-40. Although "[tihe Board does not have any specific formula or set
of criteria for parole decisionmaking," id. at 33, it can be concluded that it does, in fact,
favor prisoners exhibiting certain characteristics. Thus, parole is more likely to be
granted for older offenders, those offenders who had committed a great number of prior
offenses, and offenders who had been on parole the fewest times previously. Id. at
36-40. See generally The Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), June 22, 1977, at 5, cols. 1-4.
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tors already found to be inappropriate for sentencing judges.2 84 Insofar as punishment is the goal being pursued, the parole board is
merely "second-guessing the sentencing judge," 28 5 using the same information used by the latter. 28 6 Another problem is that the delineation of explicit criteria, without more, fails to guide parole boards in
determining how long imprisonment should continue if any of the
enumerated factors is present.2 8 7 As a result of these problems, present parole practices lead to unjustified disparity in time served among
similar incarcerated offenders, creating psychological instability on
the part of inmates who do not know how or when they will be
paroled. 2s8
Parole constitutes a deprivation of liberty inasmuch as parolees
must abide by certain rules and conditions not imposed upon other
members of society. In addition, parolees face the possibility of return to prison for violation of these rules. These deprivations, however, are not as serious as those faced by prisoners. Thus, the
nonuniform release of prisoners on parole would undermine the
equality of punishment inherent in sentences based upon just deserts. There are two basic methods for solving the problems presented by parole release in a just deserts system: parole could be
eliminated altogether, or parole release decisionmaking could be revised so as to eliminate discretion.
284

See D.

285

D.

STANLEY,

supra note 79, at 76; notes 226-31 supra and accompanying

text.
STANLEY,

supra note 79, at 76.

286 In the federal system, the presentence investigation report, together with state-

ments from the offender, are frequently the basic sources of information for the judge
and the parole board. See Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, The Presentence Investigation Report, in PROBATION AND PAROLE 69

(1970). Judge Frankel points out that all factors which are properly considered by the
judge or the parole board are available on the day of sentencing. Consequently, a parole
release decision should not be delayed beyond the time of sentencing. M. FRANKEL,
supra note 12, at 109.
287 Gottfredson, supra note 278, at 36. The result of this lack of guidelines to govern
the use of criteria is that parole release decisions pursuant to the criteria are as arbitrary
as those made with no reasons given. Id. at 36-37. When a prospective parolee questions the decision of a parole board, the board should be able to articulate the reason or
reasons for denying parole as well as the weight given each relevant factor in that case.
In New Jersey, since the decision in Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J.
238, 249-50, 277 A.2d 193, 198-99 (1971), the Parole Board has been required to furnish
reasons for a denial of parole. The Parole Board's rules have been accordingly amended.
See 3 N.J. REG. 135 (1971), as amended, N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:70-4.7 (Supp. 1976). In
Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 353-59, 301 A.2d 727, 729-35
(1973), the New Jersey supreme court construed what type of notice of the reasons for
denying parole would be adequate to satisfy the requirement.
298 See Harris, supra note 14, at 297-98.
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The elimination of parole would necessarily leave determination
of length of sentence completely to the sentencing judge, 289 possibly
depriving institutional managers of a useful tool for controlling inmates. Inmates who know that disruptive behavior is likely to postpone or prevent their parole release date will be more docile 2 90 than
those who are serving a fixed sentence set by a judge. The disruption
problem is not easily solved through greater use of prison disciplinary
procedures, since courts have imposed substantial procedural due
process protections in this area. 2 91 As presently applied, those disciplinary procedures may increase prison time within the outer limits
of the sentence imposed by a judge. 292 If parole were abolished and
judges imposed fixed sentences, however, any prison time meted out
through disciplinary procedures would exceed the outer limits of the
sentence judicially imposed 29 3 and therefore would probably require
289 Because nothing occurring after commission of a crime should affect the length
or form of the sentence in a just deserts system, the sentencing judge and the parole
board would be performing the same function on the basis of the same data and considerations. It might be argued that in the vast majority of cases judges are in no better
position to determine length of sentence than are parole boards. Nonetheless, since
imposing sentence has traditionally been a function of the judiciary in this nation, there
appears to be no reason to delay, duplicate or reassign that function in a just deserts
system. See generally Project, supra note 121, at 898.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S6385 (daily ed. May 2, 1977), appears to recognize the need to concentrate more of the parole decisionmaking power in
the judge. Section 2301(c) of the bill vests the sentencing judge with discretion to determine a basic period of parole ineligibility, tip to nine-tenths of the sentence. Id.
§ 2301(c). If no such period is imposed, the prisoner is eligible for parole release after
serving the first six months of the term. See id. § 3831(a). Unfortunately, however, the
factors to be considered by the judge, id. § 2003(a), and later by the Parole Commission,
id. §§ 3831(c), 3834(a), are descriptive, and they give weight to considerations of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. In addition, it is still the Parole Commission
which makes the ultimate decision on whether and when parole should be granted.
Even though parole "shall" be granted unless it is deemed inappropriate, id.§ 3831(c),
some of the factors which make it inappropriate should not be considered, id.
§ 3831(c)(2)-(3) (likelihood of parole violations; "effect on institutional discipline"). Thus,
the parole scheme proposed by the bill also fails to conform to just deserts principles.
290 Cf. N. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 17 (prisoners aware that they must present a
"facade" of "involvement in treatment programs").
291 The United States Supreme Court has held that due process protects the inmate
from disciplinary actions that are arbitrary. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546-58
(1974). As a consequence, the New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies,
Division of Correction and Parole, amended its disciplinary standards which now provide for disciplinary actions to be applied with fairness. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:35-1.1
(Supp. 1976); see Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 509, 512-13, 518-35, 341 A.2d 629,
637-38, 641-51 (1975).
292 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-140 (West 1964) (good behavior entitles a prisoner to
reductions in both the minimum and maximum ends of his sentence).
293 For example, an offender sentenced to fourteen years for aggravated rape might
repeatedly cause melees while in prison. If he had accrued no good-time credits which
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a full trial in a court of law on the disciplinary charges. Thus, the
retention of parole with at least some discretion in release decisions is
important to institutional management.
Another favorable effect of parole is that it retains, under reduced
control, offenders who need no longer be incarcerated, but who are
not yet ready for unconditional release into society. 29 4 The threat of
parole revocation coerces conformity by parolees to both the requirements of parole and of society itself. That the Model Penal Code
recognizes this effect is evidenced by its specific provision of a parole
term for every imprisoned offender.2 95 If parole release were eliminated, this surveillance of and control over recent prisoners would
decrease, as would the exposure of recently released offenders to
whatever reintegrative counseling a parole officer may provide.
Yet another objection to the elimination of parole is a political
one. Sentences under the Model Penal Code and under existing law
have been devised with the knowledge that a first offender who behaves well in an institution is eligible for parole after serving approximately one-fifth of his maximum sentence.2 9 6 With parole eliminated,
the typical offender would serve a far longer period of incarceration at a time when most commentators argue that sentences of
incarceratiQn are already too long.2 9 7 It might prove politically impossible for a legislature or other sentence- setting body to reduce sentences to one-fifth of their present length so that offenders would
serve the same actual amount of time under a no-parole model as
they do under the present system. For example, the punishment for
a first-degree crime such as aggravated rape would have to be
roughly two to three years incarceration if parole release were eliminated, as opposed to the eight to twenty years currently prescribed
by the Code. Although the actual time served under each system
would likely be the same, it would be difficult to secure acceptance
by the public of actual sentences which are so short.
A course preferable to elimination of parole is to reconcile parole
release decisionmaking with just deserts sentencing. 298 Such a course
would establish a presumptive release date after expiration of approxcould be rescinded, under a no-parole system any additional time imposed as an institutional disciplinary measure would be added on to the full fourteen-year sentence imposed by the judge.
2
94See D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at 81-82. Parole is intended to keep recent
inmates under surveillance and also to assist them in becoming reintegrated into society.295
See M.P.C. § 2C:43-9(b).
29 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
297 See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
298 See D. STANLEY, supra note 79, at 79-80.
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imately one-third of every sentence for every offense. 299 The sentenc-

ing judge, the public and the inmate would all know, at the time an
inmate is sentenced to a given term, when he would be released,
assuming institutional behavior in conformity with institutional rules.
Adoption of this type of mechanism would permit retention of the
general lengths of existing sentences and of those proposed by the
Model Penal Code. It would, however, restrict the exercise of parole
board discretion and would prevent the parole board from secondguessing sentencing judges. At the same time, the discretion needed
to maintain institutional discipline could be retained; the presumptive
date would be altered or prison disciplinary procedures invoked if an
inmate engaged in infractions of institutional rules. 30 0 Such a system
would be a further application of just deserts principles inside the
institution. Similarly, parole supervision could be maintained, with
revocation of parole possible under certain limited circumstances. 30 1
No effort would be made by the parole board to assess rehabilitation
or to predict recidivism, since such determinations would be irrelevant to the paroling decision. The benefits of just deserts sentencing
would therefore not be undermined by a parole board, and rehabilitative programs within the institution would be freed of their coercive
element.
CONCLUSION

Efforts to achieve the goals of rehabilitating offenders, incapacitating dangerous individuals, and deterring future offenses serve
to augment society's safety, and are therefore important to the design

of any criminal justice system. When judges attempt to achieve these
goals through their dispositions of individual offenders, they undermine the efficacy and justice of the system. Because of their emphasis
on rehabilitation and their expansion of the use of judicial discretion,

the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code, and PTI as mandated by the Leonardis decision, exacerbate problems inherent in
New Jersey's criminal justice system.
A system of fixed dispositions, from pretrial intervention through
sentencing and parole release decisionmaking, would eliminate unjustifiable disparity, free rehabilitative efforts from their debilitating link
29 In New Jersey, N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1452, §§ 6, 8 (introduced Feb. 3, 1976)
does propose such a system. See note 6 supra.
6
300 See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1452, §
(c) (introduced Feb. 3, 1976) (release delayed if 'inmate has engaged in conduct indictable in nature"). The second criterion
for delayed release under this bill-that the offender will probably engage in criminal
activity if released-is inappropriate in a just deserts system, because it involves a prediction of the inmate's likelihood of committing crimes if paroled. See id.
301 See id. §§ 13-15.
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to release, and make the meaning of conviction clear to offenders,
judges, and the public. It would ultimately be just to offenders.
Within such a system, sufficient discretion could be retained to permit slightly different treatment for offenders committing acts which
constitute identical statutory crimes, but which establish differing offender culpability in relation to the crime committed. Judges, however, would not be permitted to substitute one disposition for
another. The loss of liberty by an offender would be proportional to
the seriousness of the crime he committed. An amount of plea bargaining essential to just dispositions, as well as the degree of discretion needed to facilitate the maintenance of institutional discipline,
could be allowed. The substantial discretion which such a system
eliminates has been used arbitrarily and unjustly in the names of rehabilitation and justice-through-mercy; this discretion has resulted in
injustice to those offenders who have received disparate dispositions
or who have been incarcerated in order to prevent recidivism by
others, and in less rehabilitation for all inmates.
The just deserts system advocated is not only an attempt to remedy the ills of the existing dispositional system. Equally important, it
seeks to develop a system which is philosophically consistent internally and which advances the principles of justice. It is possible to
make more limited reforms than those proposed herein. This article
has articulated what the dispositional criteria ought to be and has
suggested what sentences must follow when given conditions are
found to exist. The proposed reforms would result in a just system
that advances society's interest in better protecting itself from those
who would and do violate its rules.

